Editorial

Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS)–promulgated quality metrics continue to attract critics. Physicians decry that many metrics are outside their control, while patient groups are frustrated that metrics lack meaning for beneficiaries. The Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program (HRRP) reduces payments for “excess” 30-day risk-standardized readmissions for six conditions and procedures, and may be less effective in reducing readmissions than previously reported due to intentional and increasing use of hospital observation stays.¹

In this issue, Sheehy et al² report that nearly one in five rehospitalizations were unrecognized because either the index hospitalization or the rehospitalization was an observation stay, highlighting yet another challenge with the HRRP. Limitations of their study include the use of a single year of claims data and the exclusion of Medicare Advantage claims data, as one might expect lower readmission rates in this capitated program. Opportunities for improving the HRRP could consist of updating the HRRP metric to include observation stays and, for surgical hospitalizations, extended-stay surgical recovery, wherein patients may be observed for up to 2 days following a procedure. Unfortunately, despite the HRRP missing nearly one in five readmissions, CMS would likely need additional statutory authority from Congress in order to reinterpret the definition of readmission³ to include observation stays.

Challenges with the HRRP metrics raise broader concerns about the program. For decades, administrators viewed readmissions as a utilization metric, only to have the Affordable Care Act re-designate and define all-cause readmissions as a quality metric. Yet hospitals and health systems control only some factors driving readmission. Readmissions occur for a variety of reasons, including not only poor quality of initial hospital care and inadequate care coordination, but also factors that are beyond the hospital’s purview, such as lack of access to ambulatory services, multiple and severe chronic conditions that progress or remain unresponsive to intervention,⁴ and demographic and social factors such as housing instability, health literacy, or residence in a food desert. These non-hospital factors reside within the domain of other market participants or local, state, and federal government agencies.

Challenges to the utility, validity, and appropriateness of HRRP metrics should remind policymakers of the dangers of over-legislating the details of healthcare policy and the statutory inflexibility that can ensue. Clinical care evolves, and artificial constructs—including payment categories such as observation status—may age poorly over time, exemplified best by the challenges of accessing post-acute care due to the 3-day rule.⁵ Introduced as a statutory requirement in 1967, when the average length of stay was 13.8 days and observation care did not exist as a payment category, the 3-day rule requires Medicare beneficiaries to spend 3 days admitted to the hospital in order to qualify for coverage of post-acute care, creating care gaps for observation stay patients.

Observation care itself is an artificial construct of CMS payment policy. In the Medicare program, observation care falls under Part B, exposing patients to both greater financial responsibility and billing complexity through the engagement of their supplemental insurance, even though those receiving observation care experience the same care as if hospitalized— routine monitoring, nursing care, blood draws, imaging, and diagnostic tests. While CMS requires notification of observation status and explanation of the difference in patient financial responsibility, in clinical practice, patient understanding is limited. Policymakers can support both Medicare beneficiaries and hospitals by reexamining observation care as a payment category.

Sheehy and colleagues’ work simultaneously challenges the face validity of the HRRP and the reasonableness of categorizing some inpatient stays as outpatient care in the hospital—issues that policymakers can and should address.

Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS)–promulgated quality metrics continue to attract critics. Physicians decry that many metrics are outside their control, while patient groups are frustrated that metrics lack meaning for beneficiaries. The Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program (HRRP) reduces payments for “excess” 30-day risk-standardized readmissions for six conditions and procedures, and may be less effective in reducing readmissions than previously reported due to intentional and increasing use of hospital observation stays.¹

In this issue, Sheehy et al² report that nearly one in five rehospitalizations were unrecognized because either the index hospitalization or the rehospitalization was an observation stay, highlighting yet another challenge with the HRRP. Limitations of their study include the use of a single year of claims data and the exclusion of Medicare Advantage claims data, as one might expect lower readmission rates in this capitated program. Opportunities for improving the HRRP could consist of updating the HRRP metric to include observation stays and, for surgical hospitalizations, extended-stay surgical recovery, wherein patients may be observed for up to 2 days following a procedure. Unfortunately, despite the HRRP missing nearly one in five readmissions, CMS would likely need additional statutory authority from Congress in order to reinterpret the definition of readmission³ to include observation stays.

Challenges with the HRRP metrics raise broader concerns about the program. For decades, administrators viewed readmissions as a utilization metric, only to have the Affordable Care Act re-designate and define all-cause readmissions as a quality metric. Yet hospitals and health systems control only some factors driving readmission. Readmissions occur for a variety of reasons, including not only poor quality of initial hospital care and inadequate care coordination, but also factors that are beyond the hospital’s purview, such as lack of access to ambulatory services, multiple and severe chronic conditions that progress or remain unresponsive to intervention,⁴ and demographic and social factors such as housing instability, health literacy, or residence in a food desert. These non-hospital factors reside within the domain of other market participants or local, state, and federal government agencies.

Challenges to the utility, validity, and appropriateness of HRRP metrics should remind policymakers of the dangers of over-legislating the details of healthcare policy and the statutory inflexibility that can ensue. Clinical care evolves, and artificial constructs—including payment categories such as observation status—may age poorly over time, exemplified best by the challenges of accessing post-acute care due to the 3-day rule.⁵ Introduced as a statutory requirement in 1967, when the average length of stay was 13.8 days and observation care did not exist as a payment category, the 3-day rule requires Medicare beneficiaries to spend 3 days admitted to the hospital in order to qualify for coverage of post-acute care, creating care gaps for observation stay patients.

Observation care itself is an artificial construct of CMS payment policy. In the Medicare program, observation care falls under Part B, exposing patients to both greater financial responsibility and billing complexity through the engagement of their supplemental insurance, even though those receiving observation care experience the same care as if hospitalized— routine monitoring, nursing care, blood draws, imaging, and diagnostic tests. While CMS requires notification of observation status and explanation of the difference in patient financial responsibility, in clinical practice, patient understanding is limited. Policymakers can support both Medicare beneficiaries and hospitals by reexamining observation care as a payment category.

Sheehy and colleagues’ work simultaneously challenges the face validity of the HRRP and the reasonableness of categorizing some inpatient stays as outpatient care in the hospital—issues that policymakers can and should address.

Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS)–promulgated quality metrics continue to attract critics. Physicians decry that many metrics are outside their control, while patient groups are frustrated that metrics lack meaning for beneficiaries. The Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program (HRRP) reduces payments for “excess” 30-day risk-standardized readmissions for six conditions and procedures, and may be less effective in reducing readmissions than previously reported due to intentional and increasing use of hospital observation stays.¹

In this issue, Sheehy et al² report that nearly one in five rehospitalizations were unrecognized because either the index hospitalization or the rehospitalization was an observation stay, highlighting yet another challenge with the HRRP. Limitations of their study include the use of a single year of claims data and the exclusion of Medicare Advantage claims data, as one might expect lower readmission rates in this capitated program. Opportunities for improving the HRRP could consist of updating the HRRP metric to include observation stays and, for surgical hospitalizations, extended-stay surgical recovery, wherein patients may be observed for up to 2 days following a procedure. Unfortunately, despite the HRRP missing nearly one in five readmissions, CMS would likely need additional statutory authority from Congress in order to reinterpret the definition of readmission³ to include observation stays.

Challenges with the HRRP metrics raise broader concerns about the program. For decades, administrators viewed readmissions as a utilization metric, only to have the Affordable Care Act re-designate and define all-cause readmissions as a quality metric. Yet hospitals and health systems control only some factors driving readmission. Readmissions occur for a variety of reasons, including not only poor quality of initial hospital care and inadequate care coordination, but also factors that are beyond the hospital’s purview, such as lack of access to ambulatory services, multiple and severe chronic conditions that progress or remain unresponsive to intervention,⁴ and demographic and social factors such as housing instability, health literacy, or residence in a food desert. These non-hospital factors reside within the domain of other market participants or local, state, and federal government agencies.

Challenges to the utility, validity, and appropriateness of HRRP metrics should remind policymakers of the dangers of over-legislating the details of healthcare policy and the statutory inflexibility that can ensue. Clinical care evolves, and artificial constructs—including payment categories such as observation status—may age poorly over time, exemplified best by the challenges of accessing post-acute care due to the 3-day rule.⁵ Introduced as a statutory requirement in 1967, when the average length of stay was 13.8 days and observation care did not exist as a payment category, the 3-day rule requires Medicare beneficiaries to spend 3 days admitted to the hospital in order to qualify for coverage of post-acute care, creating care gaps for observation stay patients.

Observation care itself is an artificial construct of CMS payment policy. In the Medicare program, observation care falls under Part B, exposing patients to both greater financial responsibility and billing complexity through the engagement of their supplemental insurance, even though those receiving observation care experience the same care as if hospitalized— routine monitoring, nursing care, blood draws, imaging, and diagnostic tests. While CMS requires notification of observation status and explanation of the difference in patient financial responsibility, in clinical practice, patient understanding is limited. Policymakers can support both Medicare beneficiaries and hospitals by reexamining observation care as a payment category.

Sheehy and colleagues’ work simultaneously challenges the face validity of the HRRP and the reasonableness of categorizing some inpatient stays as outpatient care in the hospital—issues that policymakers can and should address.

“If your time to you is worth savin’

Then you better start swimmin’ or you’ll sink like a stone

For the times they are a-changin’...”

–Bob Dylan

The Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education requires residency programs to limit and track trainee work hours to reduce the risk of fatigue, burnout, and medical errors. These hours are documented most often by self-report, at the cost of additional administrative burden for trainees and programs, dubious accuracy, and potentially incentivizing misrepresentation.¹

Thus, the study by Soleimani and colleagues² in this issue is a welcome addition to the literature on duty-hours tracking. Using timestamp data from the electronic health record (EHR), the authors developed and collected validity evidence for an automated computerized algorithm to measure how much time trainees were spending on clinical work. The study was conducted at a large academic internal medicine residency program and tracked 203 trainees working 14,610 days. The authors compared their results to trainee self-report data. Though the approach centered on EHR access logs, it accommodated common scenarios of time away from the computer while at the hospital (eg, during patient rounds). Crucially, the algorithm included EHR access while at home. The absolute discrepancy between the algorithm and self-report averaged 1.38 hours per day. Notably, EHR work at home accounted for about an extra hour per day. When considering in-hospital work alone, the authors found 3% to 13% of trainees exceeding 80-hour workweek limits, but when adding out-of-hospital work, this percentage rose to 10% to 21%.

The authors used inventive methods to improve accuracy. They prespecified EHR functions that constituted active clinical work, classifying reading without editing notes or placing orders simply as “educational study,” which they excluded from duty hours. They ensured that time spent off-site was included and that logins from personal devices while in-hospital were not double-counted. Caveats to the study include the limited generalizability for institutions without the computational resources to replicate the model. The authors acknowledged the inherent flaw in using trainee self-report as the “gold standard,” and potentially some subset of the results could have been corroborated with time-motion observation studies.³ The decision to exclude passive medical record review at home as work arguably discounts the integral value that the “chart biopsy” has on direct patient care; it probably led to systematic underestimation of duty hours for junior and senior residents, who may be most likely to contribute in this way. Similarly, not counting time spent with patients at the end of the day after sign-out risks undercounting hours as well. Nonetheless, this study represents a rigorously designed and scalable approach to meeting regulatory requirements that can potentially lighten the administrative task load for trainees, improve reporting accuracy, and facilitate research comparing work hours to other variables of interest (eg, efficiency). The model can be generalized to other specialties and could document workload for staff physicians as well.

Merits of the study aside, the algorithm underscores troubling realities about the practice of medicine in the 21st century. Do we now equate clinical work with time on the computer? Is our contribution as physicians defined primarily by our presence at the keyboard, rather than the bedside?⁴ Future research facilitated by automated hours tracking is likely to further elucidate a connection between time spent in the EHR with burnout⁴ and job dissatisfaction, and the premise of this study is emblematic of the erosion of clinical work-life boundaries that began even before the pandemic.⁵ While the “times they are a-changin’,” in this respect, it may not be for the better.

“If your time to you is worth savin’

Then you better start swimmin’ or you’ll sink like a stone

For the times they are a-changin’...”

–Bob Dylan

The Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education requires residency programs to limit and track trainee work hours to reduce the risk of fatigue, burnout, and medical errors. These hours are documented most often by self-report, at the cost of additional administrative burden for trainees and programs, dubious accuracy, and potentially incentivizing misrepresentation.¹

Thus, the study by Soleimani and colleagues² in this issue is a welcome addition to the literature on duty-hours tracking. Using timestamp data from the electronic health record (EHR), the authors developed and collected validity evidence for an automated computerized algorithm to measure how much time trainees were spending on clinical work. The study was conducted at a large academic internal medicine residency program and tracked 203 trainees working 14,610 days. The authors compared their results to trainee self-report data. Though the approach centered on EHR access logs, it accommodated common scenarios of time away from the computer while at the hospital (eg, during patient rounds). Crucially, the algorithm included EHR access while at home. The absolute discrepancy between the algorithm and self-report averaged 1.38 hours per day. Notably, EHR work at home accounted for about an extra hour per day. When considering in-hospital work alone, the authors found 3% to 13% of trainees exceeding 80-hour workweek limits, but when adding out-of-hospital work, this percentage rose to 10% to 21%.

The authors used inventive methods to improve accuracy. They prespecified EHR functions that constituted active clinical work, classifying reading without editing notes or placing orders simply as “educational study,” which they excluded from duty hours. They ensured that time spent off-site was included and that logins from personal devices while in-hospital were not double-counted. Caveats to the study include the limited generalizability for institutions without the computational resources to replicate the model. The authors acknowledged the inherent flaw in using trainee self-report as the “gold standard,” and potentially some subset of the results could have been corroborated with time-motion observation studies.³ The decision to exclude passive medical record review at home as work arguably discounts the integral value that the “chart biopsy” has on direct patient care; it probably led to systematic underestimation of duty hours for junior and senior residents, who may be most likely to contribute in this way. Similarly, not counting time spent with patients at the end of the day after sign-out risks undercounting hours as well. Nonetheless, this study represents a rigorously designed and scalable approach to meeting regulatory requirements that can potentially lighten the administrative task load for trainees, improve reporting accuracy, and facilitate research comparing work hours to other variables of interest (eg, efficiency). The model can be generalized to other specialties and could document workload for staff physicians as well.

Merits of the study aside, the algorithm underscores troubling realities about the practice of medicine in the 21st century. Do we now equate clinical work with time on the computer? Is our contribution as physicians defined primarily by our presence at the keyboard, rather than the bedside?⁴ Future research facilitated by automated hours tracking is likely to further elucidate a connection between time spent in the EHR with burnout⁴ and job dissatisfaction, and the premise of this study is emblematic of the erosion of clinical work-life boundaries that began even before the pandemic.⁵ While the “times they are a-changin’,” in this respect, it may not be for the better.

“If your time to you is worth savin’

Then you better start swimmin’ or you’ll sink like a stone

For the times they are a-changin’...”

–Bob Dylan

The Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education requires residency programs to limit and track trainee work hours to reduce the risk of fatigue, burnout, and medical errors. These hours are documented most often by self-report, at the cost of additional administrative burden for trainees and programs, dubious accuracy, and potentially incentivizing misrepresentation.¹

Thus, the study by Soleimani and colleagues² in this issue is a welcome addition to the literature on duty-hours tracking. Using timestamp data from the electronic health record (EHR), the authors developed and collected validity evidence for an automated computerized algorithm to measure how much time trainees were spending on clinical work. The study was conducted at a large academic internal medicine residency program and tracked 203 trainees working 14,610 days. The authors compared their results to trainee self-report data. Though the approach centered on EHR access logs, it accommodated common scenarios of time away from the computer while at the hospital (eg, during patient rounds). Crucially, the algorithm included EHR access while at home. The absolute discrepancy between the algorithm and self-report averaged 1.38 hours per day. Notably, EHR work at home accounted for about an extra hour per day. When considering in-hospital work alone, the authors found 3% to 13% of trainees exceeding 80-hour workweek limits, but when adding out-of-hospital work, this percentage rose to 10% to 21%.

The authors used inventive methods to improve accuracy. They prespecified EHR functions that constituted active clinical work, classifying reading without editing notes or placing orders simply as “educational study,” which they excluded from duty hours. They ensured that time spent off-site was included and that logins from personal devices while in-hospital were not double-counted. Caveats to the study include the limited generalizability for institutions without the computational resources to replicate the model. The authors acknowledged the inherent flaw in using trainee self-report as the “gold standard,” and potentially some subset of the results could have been corroborated with time-motion observation studies.³ The decision to exclude passive medical record review at home as work arguably discounts the integral value that the “chart biopsy” has on direct patient care; it probably led to systematic underestimation of duty hours for junior and senior residents, who may be most likely to contribute in this way. Similarly, not counting time spent with patients at the end of the day after sign-out risks undercounting hours as well. Nonetheless, this study represents a rigorously designed and scalable approach to meeting regulatory requirements that can potentially lighten the administrative task load for trainees, improve reporting accuracy, and facilitate research comparing work hours to other variables of interest (eg, efficiency). The model can be generalized to other specialties and could document workload for staff physicians as well.

Merits of the study aside, the algorithm underscores troubling realities about the practice of medicine in the 21st century. Do we now equate clinical work with time on the computer? Is our contribution as physicians defined primarily by our presence at the keyboard, rather than the bedside?⁴ Future research facilitated by automated hours tracking is likely to further elucidate a connection between time spent in the EHR with burnout⁴ and job dissatisfaction, and the premise of this study is emblematic of the erosion of clinical work-life boundaries that began even before the pandemic.⁵ While the “times they are a-changin’,” in this respect, it may not be for the better.

Although malpractice “crises” come and go, liability fears persist near top of mind for most physicians.¹ Liability insurance premiums have plateaued in recent years, but remain at high levels, and the prospect of being reported to the National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB) or listed on a state medical board’s website for a paid liability claim is unsettling. The high-acuity setting and the absence of longitudinal patient relationships in hospital medicine may theoretically raise malpractice risk, yet hospitalists’ liability risk remains understudied.²

The contribution by Schaffer and colleagues³ in this issue of the Journal of Hospital Medicine is thus welcome and illuminating. The researchers examine the liability risk of hospitalists compared to that of other specialties by utilizing a large database of malpractice claims compiled from multiple insurers across a decade.³ In a field of research plagued by inadequate data, the Comparative Benchmarking System (CBS) built by CRICO/RMF is a treasure. Unlike the primary national database of malpractice claims, the NPDB, the CBS contains information on claims that did not result in a payment, as well as physicians’ specialty and detailed information on the allegations, injuries, and their causes. The CBS contains almost a third of all medical liability claims made in the United States during the study period, supporting generalizability.

Schaffer and colleagues¹ found that hospitalists had a lower claims rate than physicians in emergency medicine or neurosurgery. The rate was on par with that for non-hospital general internists, even though hospitalists often care for higher-acuity patients. Although claims rates dropped over the study period for physicians in neurosurgery, emergency medicine, psychiatry, and internal medicine subspecialties, the rate for hospitalists did not change significantly. Further, the median payout on claims against hospitalists was the highest of all the specialties examined, except neurosurgery. This reflects higher injury severity in hospitalist cases: half the claims against hospitalists involved death and three-quarters were high severity.

The study is not without limitations. Due to missing data, only a fraction of the claims (8.2% to 11%) in the full dataset are used in the claims rate analysis. Regression models predicting a payment are based on a small number of payments for hospitalists (n = 363). Further, the authors advance, as a potential explanation for hospitalists’ higher liability risk, that hospitalists are disproportionately young compared to other specialists, but the dataset lacks age data. These limitations suggest caution in the authors’ overall conclusion that “the malpractice environment for hospitalists is becoming less favorable.”

Nevertheless, several important insights emerge from their analysis. The very existence of claims demonstrates that patient harm continues. The contributing factors and judgment errors found in these claims demonstrate that much of this harm is potentially preventable and a risk to patient safety. Whether or not the authors’ young-hospitalist hypothesis is ultimately proven, it is difficult to argue with more mentorship as a means to improve safety. Also, preventing or intercepting judgment errors remains a vexing challenge in medicine that undoubtedly calls for creative clinical decision support solutions. Schaffer and colleagues¹ also note that hospitalists are increasingly co-managing patients with other specialties, such as orthopedic surgery. Whether this new practice model drives hospitalist liability risk because hospitalists are practicing in areas in which they have less experience (as the authors posit) or whether hospitalists are simply more likely to be named in a suit as part of a specialty team with higher liability risk remains unknown and merits further investigation.

Ultimately, regardless of whether the liability environment is worsening for hospitalists, the need to improve our liability system is clear. There is room to improve the system on a number of metrics, including properly compensating negligently harmed patients without unduly burdening providers. The system also induces defensive medicine and has not driven safety improvements as expected. The liability environment, as a result, remains challenging not just for hospitalists, but for all patients and physicians as well.

Although malpractice “crises” come and go, liability fears persist near top of mind for most physicians.¹ Liability insurance premiums have plateaued in recent years, but remain at high levels, and the prospect of being reported to the National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB) or listed on a state medical board’s website for a paid liability claim is unsettling. The high-acuity setting and the absence of longitudinal patient relationships in hospital medicine may theoretically raise malpractice risk, yet hospitalists’ liability risk remains understudied.²

The contribution by Schaffer and colleagues³ in this issue of the Journal of Hospital Medicine is thus welcome and illuminating. The researchers examine the liability risk of hospitalists compared to that of other specialties by utilizing a large database of malpractice claims compiled from multiple insurers across a decade.³ In a field of research plagued by inadequate data, the Comparative Benchmarking System (CBS) built by CRICO/RMF is a treasure. Unlike the primary national database of malpractice claims, the NPDB, the CBS contains information on claims that did not result in a payment, as well as physicians’ specialty and detailed information on the allegations, injuries, and their causes. The CBS contains almost a third of all medical liability claims made in the United States during the study period, supporting generalizability.

Schaffer and colleagues¹ found that hospitalists had a lower claims rate than physicians in emergency medicine or neurosurgery. The rate was on par with that for non-hospital general internists, even though hospitalists often care for higher-acuity patients. Although claims rates dropped over the study period for physicians in neurosurgery, emergency medicine, psychiatry, and internal medicine subspecialties, the rate for hospitalists did not change significantly. Further, the median payout on claims against hospitalists was the highest of all the specialties examined, except neurosurgery. This reflects higher injury severity in hospitalist cases: half the claims against hospitalists involved death and three-quarters were high severity.

The study is not without limitations. Due to missing data, only a fraction of the claims (8.2% to 11%) in the full dataset are used in the claims rate analysis. Regression models predicting a payment are based on a small number of payments for hospitalists (n = 363). Further, the authors advance, as a potential explanation for hospitalists’ higher liability risk, that hospitalists are disproportionately young compared to other specialists, but the dataset lacks age data. These limitations suggest caution in the authors’ overall conclusion that “the malpractice environment for hospitalists is becoming less favorable.”

Nevertheless, several important insights emerge from their analysis. The very existence of claims demonstrates that patient harm continues. The contributing factors and judgment errors found in these claims demonstrate that much of this harm is potentially preventable and a risk to patient safety. Whether or not the authors’ young-hospitalist hypothesis is ultimately proven, it is difficult to argue with more mentorship as a means to improve safety. Also, preventing or intercepting judgment errors remains a vexing challenge in medicine that undoubtedly calls for creative clinical decision support solutions. Schaffer and colleagues¹ also note that hospitalists are increasingly co-managing patients with other specialties, such as orthopedic surgery. Whether this new practice model drives hospitalist liability risk because hospitalists are practicing in areas in which they have less experience (as the authors posit) or whether hospitalists are simply more likely to be named in a suit as part of a specialty team with higher liability risk remains unknown and merits further investigation.

Ultimately, regardless of whether the liability environment is worsening for hospitalists, the need to improve our liability system is clear. There is room to improve the system on a number of metrics, including properly compensating negligently harmed patients without unduly burdening providers. The system also induces defensive medicine and has not driven safety improvements as expected. The liability environment, as a result, remains challenging not just for hospitalists, but for all patients and physicians as well.

Although malpractice “crises” come and go, liability fears persist near top of mind for most physicians.¹ Liability insurance premiums have plateaued in recent years, but remain at high levels, and the prospect of being reported to the National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB) or listed on a state medical board’s website for a paid liability claim is unsettling. The high-acuity setting and the absence of longitudinal patient relationships in hospital medicine may theoretically raise malpractice risk, yet hospitalists’ liability risk remains understudied.²

The contribution by Schaffer and colleagues³ in this issue of the Journal of Hospital Medicine is thus welcome and illuminating. The researchers examine the liability risk of hospitalists compared to that of other specialties by utilizing a large database of malpractice claims compiled from multiple insurers across a decade.³ In a field of research plagued by inadequate data, the Comparative Benchmarking System (CBS) built by CRICO/RMF is a treasure. Unlike the primary national database of malpractice claims, the NPDB, the CBS contains information on claims that did not result in a payment, as well as physicians’ specialty and detailed information on the allegations, injuries, and their causes. The CBS contains almost a third of all medical liability claims made in the United States during the study period, supporting generalizability.

Schaffer and colleagues¹ found that hospitalists had a lower claims rate than physicians in emergency medicine or neurosurgery. The rate was on par with that for non-hospital general internists, even though hospitalists often care for higher-acuity patients. Although claims rates dropped over the study period for physicians in neurosurgery, emergency medicine, psychiatry, and internal medicine subspecialties, the rate for hospitalists did not change significantly. Further, the median payout on claims against hospitalists was the highest of all the specialties examined, except neurosurgery. This reflects higher injury severity in hospitalist cases: half the claims against hospitalists involved death and three-quarters were high severity.

The study is not without limitations. Due to missing data, only a fraction of the claims (8.2% to 11%) in the full dataset are used in the claims rate analysis. Regression models predicting a payment are based on a small number of payments for hospitalists (n = 363). Further, the authors advance, as a potential explanation for hospitalists’ higher liability risk, that hospitalists are disproportionately young compared to other specialists, but the dataset lacks age data. These limitations suggest caution in the authors’ overall conclusion that “the malpractice environment for hospitalists is becoming less favorable.”

Nevertheless, several important insights emerge from their analysis. The very existence of claims demonstrates that patient harm continues. The contributing factors and judgment errors found in these claims demonstrate that much of this harm is potentially preventable and a risk to patient safety. Whether or not the authors’ young-hospitalist hypothesis is ultimately proven, it is difficult to argue with more mentorship as a means to improve safety. Also, preventing or intercepting judgment errors remains a vexing challenge in medicine that undoubtedly calls for creative clinical decision support solutions. Schaffer and colleagues¹ also note that hospitalists are increasingly co-managing patients with other specialties, such as orthopedic surgery. Whether this new practice model drives hospitalist liability risk because hospitalists are practicing in areas in which they have less experience (as the authors posit) or whether hospitalists are simply more likely to be named in a suit as part of a specialty team with higher liability risk remains unknown and merits further investigation.

Ultimately, regardless of whether the liability environment is worsening for hospitalists, the need to improve our liability system is clear. There is room to improve the system on a number of metrics, including properly compensating negligently harmed patients without unduly burdening providers. The system also induces defensive medicine and has not driven safety improvements as expected. The liability environment, as a result, remains challenging not just for hospitalists, but for all patients and physicians as well.

With another long winter officially in the rearview mirror and spring sunshine displaying new signs of life outdoors, I am excited to share some of the changes happening inside the offices of the Journal of Clinical Outcomes Management (JCOM). It is my pleasure to introduce Ebrahim Barkoudah, MD, MPH, as the journal’s new physician Editor in Chief. Dr. Barkoudah’s extensive experience in education and his work to improve patient outcomes will be assets to JCOM.

Specializing in both internal medicine and hospital medicine, Dr. Barkoudah is the Associate Director of the Hospital Medicine Unit and a Medical Director in the Department of Medicine at Brigham and Women’s Hospital in Boston. He is also Assistant Professor of Medicine at Harvard Medical School, where he led the school’s international education efforts.

Dr. Barkoudah serves patients with a range of complex clinical disorders, managing their care and seeking innovative treatment options. His research interest is in health care outcomes as well as clinical trials of therapeutic interventions. Dr. Barkoudah also serves on numerous clinical innovation committees at Brigham Health and national task forces.

Dr. Barkoudah is an active member of several professional societies including the American College of Physicians, Society of Hospital Medicine, American Heart Association, Massachusetts Medical Society, among others. He was the Institutional Administration Fellow of the Safety and Quality Fellowship Program at the Institution for Healthcare Improvement.

On behalf of the JCOM Editorial Review Board, I want to extend a special thank you to outgoing editor Lori Tishler, MD, MPH. Dr. Tishler’s impact on the journal cannot be overstated, and we are indebted to the time and expertise she shared with the journal during her tenure.

—Eric Seger

With another long winter officially in the rearview mirror and spring sunshine displaying new signs of life outdoors, I am excited to share some of the changes happening inside the offices of the Journal of Clinical Outcomes Management (JCOM). It is my pleasure to introduce Ebrahim Barkoudah, MD, MPH, as the journal’s new physician Editor in Chief. Dr. Barkoudah’s extensive experience in education and his work to improve patient outcomes will be assets to JCOM.

Specializing in both internal medicine and hospital medicine, Dr. Barkoudah is the Associate Director of the Hospital Medicine Unit and a Medical Director in the Department of Medicine at Brigham and Women’s Hospital in Boston. He is also Assistant Professor of Medicine at Harvard Medical School, where he led the school’s international education efforts.

Dr. Barkoudah serves patients with a range of complex clinical disorders, managing their care and seeking innovative treatment options. His research interest is in health care outcomes as well as clinical trials of therapeutic interventions. Dr. Barkoudah also serves on numerous clinical innovation committees at Brigham Health and national task forces.

Dr. Barkoudah is an active member of several professional societies including the American College of Physicians, Society of Hospital Medicine, American Heart Association, Massachusetts Medical Society, among others. He was the Institutional Administration Fellow of the Safety and Quality Fellowship Program at the Institution for Healthcare Improvement.

On behalf of the JCOM Editorial Review Board, I want to extend a special thank you to outgoing editor Lori Tishler, MD, MPH. Dr. Tishler’s impact on the journal cannot be overstated, and we are indebted to the time and expertise she shared with the journal during her tenure.

—Eric Seger

With another long winter officially in the rearview mirror and spring sunshine displaying new signs of life outdoors, I am excited to share some of the changes happening inside the offices of the Journal of Clinical Outcomes Management (JCOM). It is my pleasure to introduce Ebrahim Barkoudah, MD, MPH, as the journal’s new physician Editor in Chief. Dr. Barkoudah’s extensive experience in education and his work to improve patient outcomes will be assets to JCOM.

Specializing in both internal medicine and hospital medicine, Dr. Barkoudah is the Associate Director of the Hospital Medicine Unit and a Medical Director in the Department of Medicine at Brigham and Women’s Hospital in Boston. He is also Assistant Professor of Medicine at Harvard Medical School, where he led the school’s international education efforts.

Dr. Barkoudah serves patients with a range of complex clinical disorders, managing their care and seeking innovative treatment options. His research interest is in health care outcomes as well as clinical trials of therapeutic interventions. Dr. Barkoudah also serves on numerous clinical innovation committees at Brigham Health and national task forces.

Dr. Barkoudah is an active member of several professional societies including the American College of Physicians, Society of Hospital Medicine, American Heart Association, Massachusetts Medical Society, among others. He was the Institutional Administration Fellow of the Safety and Quality Fellowship Program at the Institution for Healthcare Improvement.

On behalf of the JCOM Editorial Review Board, I want to extend a special thank you to outgoing editor Lori Tishler, MD, MPH. Dr. Tishler’s impact on the journal cannot be overstated, and we are indebted to the time and expertise she shared with the journal during her tenure.

—Eric Seger

Targeting “discharge before noon” (DBN) for hospitalized patients has been proposed as a way to improve hospital throughput and patient safety by reducing emergency department (ED) boarding and crowding. In this issue, Kirubarajan et al¹ report no association between morning discharge and length of stay (LOS) for either the ED or hospitalization.¹ This large (189,781 patients) 7-year study from seven quite different Canadian hospitals adds important data to a literature that remains divided about whether DBN helps or hurts hospital LOS and ED boarding.

Unlike trials reporting interventions to encourage DBN, this observational study was unique in that it took each day as the unit of observation. This method cleverly allowed the authors to examine whether days with more discharges before noon conferred a lower mean ED and inpatient LOS among patients admitted on those days. Their approach appropriately reframes the central issue as one of patient flow.

Kirubarajan et al’s most notable, and perhaps surprising, finding is the lack of association between morning discharge and ED LOS. Computer modeling supports the hypothesis that ED throughput will improve on days with earlier inpatient bed availability.² Several studies have also noted earlier ED departure times and decreased ED wait times after implementing interventions to promote DBN.³ Why might the authors’ findings contradict previous studies? Their outcomes may in part be due to high ED LOS (>14 hours), exceeding Canadian published targets and reports from the United States.^4,5 Problems relating to ED resources, practice, and hospital census may have overwhelmed DBN as factors in boarding. The interpretation of their findings is limited by the authors’ decision to report only ED LOS, rather than including the time between a decision to admit and ED departure (boarding time).

While early studies that focused on interventions to promote DBN noted decreased inpatient LOS after their implementation, later studies found no effect or even an increase in LOS for general internal medicine patients. Concerns have been raised about the confounding effect of concurrent initiatives aimed at improving LOS as well as misaligned incentives to delay discharge to the following morning. As the number of conflicting studies mounts, and with the current report in hand, it is tempting to conclude that for the DBN evidence base as a whole, we are observing random variation around no effect.

With growing doubt about benefits of morning discharge, perhaps we should turn our attention away from the question of how to increase DBN and consider instead why and at what cost. Hospitals are delicate organisms; a singular focus on one metric will undoubtedly impact others. Does the effort to discharge before noon consume valuable morning hours and detract from the care of other patients? Are patients held overnight unnecessarily to comply with DBN? Are there consequences in patient, nursing, or trainee satisfaction? Is bedside teaching affected?

And as concepts of patient-centered care are increasingly valued, we may ask whether DBN is such a concept, or is it rather an increasingly dubious strategy aimed at regularizing hospital operations? The need for a more holistic assessment of “discharge quality” is apparent. Instead of focusing on a particular hour, initiatives should determine the “best, earliest discharge time” for each patient and align multidisciplinary efforts toward this patient-centered goal. Such efforts are already underway in pediatric hospitals, where fixed discharge times are being replaced by discharge milestones embedded into the electronic medical record.⁶ An instrument to track “discharge readiness” such as this one, paired with ongoing analysis of the barriers to timely discharge, might better facilitate throughput by targeting the entire admission, rather than concentrating pressure on its final hours.

Targeting “discharge before noon” (DBN) for hospitalized patients has been proposed as a way to improve hospital throughput and patient safety by reducing emergency department (ED) boarding and crowding. In this issue, Kirubarajan et al¹ report no association between morning discharge and length of stay (LOS) for either the ED or hospitalization.¹ This large (189,781 patients) 7-year study from seven quite different Canadian hospitals adds important data to a literature that remains divided about whether DBN helps or hurts hospital LOS and ED boarding.

Unlike trials reporting interventions to encourage DBN, this observational study was unique in that it took each day as the unit of observation. This method cleverly allowed the authors to examine whether days with more discharges before noon conferred a lower mean ED and inpatient LOS among patients admitted on those days. Their approach appropriately reframes the central issue as one of patient flow.

Kirubarajan et al’s most notable, and perhaps surprising, finding is the lack of association between morning discharge and ED LOS. Computer modeling supports the hypothesis that ED throughput will improve on days with earlier inpatient bed availability.² Several studies have also noted earlier ED departure times and decreased ED wait times after implementing interventions to promote DBN.³ Why might the authors’ findings contradict previous studies? Their outcomes may in part be due to high ED LOS (>14 hours), exceeding Canadian published targets and reports from the United States.^4,5 Problems relating to ED resources, practice, and hospital census may have overwhelmed DBN as factors in boarding. The interpretation of their findings is limited by the authors’ decision to report only ED LOS, rather than including the time between a decision to admit and ED departure (boarding time).

While early studies that focused on interventions to promote DBN noted decreased inpatient LOS after their implementation, later studies found no effect or even an increase in LOS for general internal medicine patients. Concerns have been raised about the confounding effect of concurrent initiatives aimed at improving LOS as well as misaligned incentives to delay discharge to the following morning. As the number of conflicting studies mounts, and with the current report in hand, it is tempting to conclude that for the DBN evidence base as a whole, we are observing random variation around no effect.

With growing doubt about benefits of morning discharge, perhaps we should turn our attention away from the question of how to increase DBN and consider instead why and at what cost. Hospitals are delicate organisms; a singular focus on one metric will undoubtedly impact others. Does the effort to discharge before noon consume valuable morning hours and detract from the care of other patients? Are patients held overnight unnecessarily to comply with DBN? Are there consequences in patient, nursing, or trainee satisfaction? Is bedside teaching affected?

And as concepts of patient-centered care are increasingly valued, we may ask whether DBN is such a concept, or is it rather an increasingly dubious strategy aimed at regularizing hospital operations? The need for a more holistic assessment of “discharge quality” is apparent. Instead of focusing on a particular hour, initiatives should determine the “best, earliest discharge time” for each patient and align multidisciplinary efforts toward this patient-centered goal. Such efforts are already underway in pediatric hospitals, where fixed discharge times are being replaced by discharge milestones embedded into the electronic medical record.⁶ An instrument to track “discharge readiness” such as this one, paired with ongoing analysis of the barriers to timely discharge, might better facilitate throughput by targeting the entire admission, rather than concentrating pressure on its final hours.

Targeting “discharge before noon” (DBN) for hospitalized patients has been proposed as a way to improve hospital throughput and patient safety by reducing emergency department (ED) boarding and crowding. In this issue, Kirubarajan et al¹ report no association between morning discharge and length of stay (LOS) for either the ED or hospitalization.¹ This large (189,781 patients) 7-year study from seven quite different Canadian hospitals adds important data to a literature that remains divided about whether DBN helps or hurts hospital LOS and ED boarding.

Unlike trials reporting interventions to encourage DBN, this observational study was unique in that it took each day as the unit of observation. This method cleverly allowed the authors to examine whether days with more discharges before noon conferred a lower mean ED and inpatient LOS among patients admitted on those days. Their approach appropriately reframes the central issue as one of patient flow.

Kirubarajan et al’s most notable, and perhaps surprising, finding is the lack of association between morning discharge and ED LOS. Computer modeling supports the hypothesis that ED throughput will improve on days with earlier inpatient bed availability.² Several studies have also noted earlier ED departure times and decreased ED wait times after implementing interventions to promote DBN.³ Why might the authors’ findings contradict previous studies? Their outcomes may in part be due to high ED LOS (>14 hours), exceeding Canadian published targets and reports from the United States.^4,5 Problems relating to ED resources, practice, and hospital census may have overwhelmed DBN as factors in boarding. The interpretation of their findings is limited by the authors’ decision to report only ED LOS, rather than including the time between a decision to admit and ED departure (boarding time).

While early studies that focused on interventions to promote DBN noted decreased inpatient LOS after their implementation, later studies found no effect or even an increase in LOS for general internal medicine patients. Concerns have been raised about the confounding effect of concurrent initiatives aimed at improving LOS as well as misaligned incentives to delay discharge to the following morning. As the number of conflicting studies mounts, and with the current report in hand, it is tempting to conclude that for the DBN evidence base as a whole, we are observing random variation around no effect.

With growing doubt about benefits of morning discharge, perhaps we should turn our attention away from the question of how to increase DBN and consider instead why and at what cost. Hospitals are delicate organisms; a singular focus on one metric will undoubtedly impact others. Does the effort to discharge before noon consume valuable morning hours and detract from the care of other patients? Are patients held overnight unnecessarily to comply with DBN? Are there consequences in patient, nursing, or trainee satisfaction? Is bedside teaching affected?

And as concepts of patient-centered care are increasingly valued, we may ask whether DBN is such a concept, or is it rather an increasingly dubious strategy aimed at regularizing hospital operations? The need for a more holistic assessment of “discharge quality” is apparent. Instead of focusing on a particular hour, initiatives should determine the “best, earliest discharge time” for each patient and align multidisciplinary efforts toward this patient-centered goal. Such efforts are already underway in pediatric hospitals, where fixed discharge times are being replaced by discharge milestones embedded into the electronic medical record.⁶ An instrument to track “discharge readiness” such as this one, paired with ongoing analysis of the barriers to timely discharge, might better facilitate throughput by targeting the entire admission, rather than concentrating pressure on its final hours.

Hospital discharge is a complex, multi-stakeholder event, and evidence suggests that the quality of that transition directly relates to mortality, readmissions, and postdischarge quality of life and functional status.¹ The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services call for team-based and patient-centered discharge planning,² yet the process for achieving this is poorly defined.

In this issue of the Journal of Hospital Medicine, Manges et al³ use shared mental models (SMM) as a conceptual framework to describe differences in how care team members and patients perceive hospital discharge readiness. While our understanding of factors associated with safe and patient-centered hospital discharges is still growing, the authors focus on one critical component: lack of agreement between patients and interprofessional teams regarding discharge readiness.

Manges et al³ measured whether interprofessional team members agree, or converge, on their assessment of a patient’s discharge readiness (team-SMM convergence) and whether that assessment converges with the patient’s self-assessment (team-patient SMM convergence). They found good team-SMM convergence regarding the patient’s discharge readiness, yet teams overestimated readiness compared with the patient’s self-assessment nearly half (48.4%) of the time. A clinical trial found that clinician assessments of discharge readiness were poorly predictive of readmissions unless they were combined with a patient’s self-assessment.⁴ Manges et al’s study findings, while of limited generalizability, enhance our understanding of a potential gap in achieving patient-centered care as outlined in the Institute of Medicine’s Crossing the Quality Chasm,⁵ which urges clinicians to see patients and families as partners in improving care.

The authors also found that higher team-patient convergence was associated with teams that reported high-quality teamwork and those having more baccalaureate degree−educated nurses (BSN). While Manges et al³ did not elucidate the mechanism by which this occurs, their findings align with existing literature showing that patients receiving care from a higher proportion of BSN-prepared nurses experience an 18.7% reduction in odds of readmission.⁶ Further research investigating the link between team communication, registered nurse education, and discharge outcomes may reveal additional opportunities for interventions to improve discharge quality.

The lack of patient outcomes and the limited diversity of the patient population are substantial limitations of the study. The authors did not assess the relationship between SMMs and important outcomes like readmission or adverse events. Furthermore, most of the patients were White and English-speaking, precluding assessment of factors that disproportionately impact patient populations that already experience disparities in a multitude of health outcomes.

In summary, Manges et al³ highlight challenges and opportunities in optimizing clinician communication and ensuring that the team’s and the patient’s self-assessments align and inform discharge planning. Their findings suggest the theoretical framework of SMM holds promise in identifying and evaluating some of the complex determinants involved in high-quality, patient-centered hospital discharges.

Hospital discharge is a complex, multi-stakeholder event, and evidence suggests that the quality of that transition directly relates to mortality, readmissions, and postdischarge quality of life and functional status.¹ The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services call for team-based and patient-centered discharge planning,² yet the process for achieving this is poorly defined.

In this issue of the Journal of Hospital Medicine, Manges et al³ use shared mental models (SMM) as a conceptual framework to describe differences in how care team members and patients perceive hospital discharge readiness. While our understanding of factors associated with safe and patient-centered hospital discharges is still growing, the authors focus on one critical component: lack of agreement between patients and interprofessional teams regarding discharge readiness.

Manges et al³ measured whether interprofessional team members agree, or converge, on their assessment of a patient’s discharge readiness (team-SMM convergence) and whether that assessment converges with the patient’s self-assessment (team-patient SMM convergence). They found good team-SMM convergence regarding the patient’s discharge readiness, yet teams overestimated readiness compared with the patient’s self-assessment nearly half (48.4%) of the time. A clinical trial found that clinician assessments of discharge readiness were poorly predictive of readmissions unless they were combined with a patient’s self-assessment.⁴ Manges et al’s study findings, while of limited generalizability, enhance our understanding of a potential gap in achieving patient-centered care as outlined in the Institute of Medicine’s Crossing the Quality Chasm,⁵ which urges clinicians to see patients and families as partners in improving care.

The authors also found that higher team-patient convergence was associated with teams that reported high-quality teamwork and those having more baccalaureate degree−educated nurses (BSN). While Manges et al³ did not elucidate the mechanism by which this occurs, their findings align with existing literature showing that patients receiving care from a higher proportion of BSN-prepared nurses experience an 18.7% reduction in odds of readmission.⁶ Further research investigating the link between team communication, registered nurse education, and discharge outcomes may reveal additional opportunities for interventions to improve discharge quality.

The lack of patient outcomes and the limited diversity of the patient population are substantial limitations of the study. The authors did not assess the relationship between SMMs and important outcomes like readmission or adverse events. Furthermore, most of the patients were White and English-speaking, precluding assessment of factors that disproportionately impact patient populations that already experience disparities in a multitude of health outcomes.

In summary, Manges et al³ highlight challenges and opportunities in optimizing clinician communication and ensuring that the team’s and the patient’s self-assessments align and inform discharge planning. Their findings suggest the theoretical framework of SMM holds promise in identifying and evaluating some of the complex determinants involved in high-quality, patient-centered hospital discharges.

Hospital discharge is a complex, multi-stakeholder event, and evidence suggests that the quality of that transition directly relates to mortality, readmissions, and postdischarge quality of life and functional status.¹ The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services call for team-based and patient-centered discharge planning,² yet the process for achieving this is poorly defined.

In this issue of the Journal of Hospital Medicine, Manges et al³ use shared mental models (SMM) as a conceptual framework to describe differences in how care team members and patients perceive hospital discharge readiness. While our understanding of factors associated with safe and patient-centered hospital discharges is still growing, the authors focus on one critical component: lack of agreement between patients and interprofessional teams regarding discharge readiness.

Manges et al³ measured whether interprofessional team members agree, or converge, on their assessment of a patient’s discharge readiness (team-SMM convergence) and whether that assessment converges with the patient’s self-assessment (team-patient SMM convergence). They found good team-SMM convergence regarding the patient’s discharge readiness, yet teams overestimated readiness compared with the patient’s self-assessment nearly half (48.4%) of the time. A clinical trial found that clinician assessments of discharge readiness were poorly predictive of readmissions unless they were combined with a patient’s self-assessment.⁴ Manges et al’s study findings, while of limited generalizability, enhance our understanding of a potential gap in achieving patient-centered care as outlined in the Institute of Medicine’s Crossing the Quality Chasm,⁵ which urges clinicians to see patients and families as partners in improving care.

The authors also found that higher team-patient convergence was associated with teams that reported high-quality teamwork and those having more baccalaureate degree−educated nurses (BSN). While Manges et al³ did not elucidate the mechanism by which this occurs, their findings align with existing literature showing that patients receiving care from a higher proportion of BSN-prepared nurses experience an 18.7% reduction in odds of readmission.⁶ Further research investigating the link between team communication, registered nurse education, and discharge outcomes may reveal additional opportunities for interventions to improve discharge quality.

The lack of patient outcomes and the limited diversity of the patient population are substantial limitations of the study. The authors did not assess the relationship between SMMs and important outcomes like readmission or adverse events. Furthermore, most of the patients were White and English-speaking, precluding assessment of factors that disproportionately impact patient populations that already experience disparities in a multitude of health outcomes.

In summary, Manges et al³ highlight challenges and opportunities in optimizing clinician communication and ensuring that the team’s and the patient’s self-assessments align and inform discharge planning. Their findings suggest the theoretical framework of SMM holds promise in identifying and evaluating some of the complex determinants involved in high-quality, patient-centered hospital discharges.