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The Veteran’s Canon Under Fire
The Veteran’s Canon Under Fire
As Veterans Day approaches, stores and restaurants will offer discounts and free meals to veterans. Children will write thank you letters, and citizens nationwide will raise flags to honor and thank veterans. We can never repay those who lost their life, health, or livelihood in defense of the nation. Since the American Revolution, and in gratitude for that incalculable debt, the US government, on behalf of the American public, has seen fit to grant a host of benefits and services to those who wore the uniform.2,3 Among the best known are health care, burial services, compensation and pensions, home loans, and the GI Bill.
Less recognized yet arguably essential for the fair and consistent provision of these entitlements is a legal principle: the veteran’s canon. A canon is a system of rules or maxims used to interpret legal instruments, such as statutes. They are not rules but serve as a “principle that guides the interpretation of the text.”4 Since I am not a lawyer, I will undoubtedly oversimplify this legal principle, but I hope to get enough right to explain why the veteran’s canon should matter to federal health care professionals.
At its core, the veteran’s canon means that when the US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) and a veteran have a legal dispute about VA benefits, the courts will give deference to the veteran. Underscoring that any ambiguity in the statute is resolved in the veteran’s favor, the canon is known in legal circles as the Gardner deference. This is a reference to a 1994 case in which a Korean War veteran underwent surgery in a VA facility for a herniated disc he alleged caused pain and weakness in his left lower extremity.5 Gardner argued that federal statutes 38 USC § 1151 underlying corresponding VA regulation 38 CFR § 3.358(c)(3) granted disability benefits to veterans injured during VA treatment. The VA denied the disability claim, contending the regulation restricted compensation to veterans whose injury was the fault of the VA; thus, the disability had to have been the result of negligent treatment or an unforeseen therapeutic accident.5
The case wound its way through various appeals boards and courts until the Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS) ruled that the statute’s context left no ambiguity, and that any care provided under VA auspices was covered under the statute. What is important for this column is that the justices opined that had ambiguity been present, it would have legally necessitated, “applying the rule that interpretive doubt is to be resolved in the veteran’s favor.”5 In Gardner’s case, the courts reaffirmed nearly 80 years of judicial precedent upholding the veteran’s canon.
Thirty years later, Rudisill v McDonough again questioned the veteran’s canon.6 Educational benefits, namely the GI Bill, were the issue in this case. Rudisill served during 3 different periods in the US Army, totaling 8 years. Two educational programs overlapped during Rudisill’s tenure in the military: the Montgomery GI Bill and Post-9/11 Veterans Educational Assistance Act. Rudisill had used a portion of his Montgomery benefits to fund his undergraduate education and now wished to use the more extensive Post-9/11 assistance to finance his graduate degree. Rudisill and the VA disagreed about when his combined benefits would be capped, either at 36 or 48 months. After working its way through appeals courts, SCOTUS was again called upon for judgment.
The justices found that Rudisill qualified under both programs and could use them in any order he wished up to the cap. The majority found no ambiguity in the statute; however, if interpretation was required, the majority of justices indicated that the veteran’s canon would have supported Rudisill. While this sounds like good news for veterans, 2 justices authored a dissenting opinion that questioned the constitutional grounding of the veteran’s canon, noting that the “canon appears to have developed almost by accident.”6 The minority opinion suggested that when the veteran’s canon allocates resources to pay for specific veteran benefits, other interests and groups are deprived of those same resources, resulting in potential inequity.7
The potential ethical import and clinical impact of striking down the veteran’s canon is serious. It is especially concerning given that in a recent case, the SCOTUS ruling struck down another legal interpretation that also benefited the VA and ultimately veterans: the Chevron deference.8 This precedent held that when a legal dispute arises about the meaning of a specific federal agency regulation or policy, the courts should defer to the federal agency’s presumably superior understanding of the matter. The principle places the locus of decision-making with the subject-matter experts of the respective agency rather than the courts.
Ironically, given the legislative purposes of both interpretive principles, their overturning would likely introduce much more uncertainty, variation, and unpredictability in cases involving veteran benefits. This is bad news for both veterans and the VA. Veterans might not prevail as often in court when they have a reasonable claim, leading to more aggressive challenges. In response, the VA would have a heavier and more costly burden of administrative proof to defend sound decisions.9 Recently, the VA has tried to reduce the backlog of claims. The inability to have legal recourse to Chevron or Gardener could result in even more delay in adjudicating veterans’ claims that enable them to access benefits and services, already an object of congressional pressure.10
Courts will continue to debate the issue with another judicial test of the canon on the current SCOTUS docket (Bufkin v McDonough).11 The veteran’s canon was put in place to equalize the power differential between the VA and the veteran: in administrative language, to make it more likely than not that the veteran would prevail when regulations were ambiguous. There are many legal and political rationales for veteran’s canon, including enabling veterans to file claims for service-connected illnesses. The veteran’s cannon helped Vietnam War-era veterans receive VA care while researchers were still studying the sequela of Agent Orange exposure. 12 The legislative purpose of the veteran’s canon is the same as that of all VA benefits and services commemorated on Veterans Day. As expressed by SCOTUS justices in the wake of World War II, the benefit statutes should be “liberally construed for the benefit of those who left private life to serve their country in its hour of greatest need.”13
- Henderson v Shinseki, 562 US. 428, 440-441 (2011).
- US Department of Veterans Affairs, National Veteran Outreach Office. The difference between Veterans Day and Memorial Day. October 30, 2023. Accessed October 21, 2024. https://news.va.gov/125549/difference-between-veterans-day-memorial-day/
- US Department of Veterans Affairs. VA history summary. Updated August 6, 2024. Accessed October 21, 2024. https://department.va.gov/history/history-overview
- Cornell Law School, Legal Information Institute. Canons of construction. Updated March 2022. Accessed October 21, 2024. https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/canons_of_construction
- Brown v Gardner, 513 US 115 (1994).
- Rudisill v McDonough, 601 US __ (2024).
- Hoover J. Justices will decide if vets are getting the ‘benefit of the doubt’. National Law Journal. April 30, 2024. Accessed October 21, 2024. https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/2024/04/30/justices-will-decide-if-vets-are-getting-the-benefit-of-the-doubt/
- Relentless, Inc. v Department of Commerce Docket # 22-219, January 17, 2024.
- Kime P. Two veterans will argue to Supreme Court that VA disability claims aren’t getting, ‘benefit of the doubt’. Military. com. October 15, 2024. Accessed October 21, 2024. https:// www.military.com/daily-news/2024/10/15/supreme-court-hears-case-questioning-vas-commitment-favoring-veterans-benefits-decisions.html
- Rehagen J. SCOTUS’s chevron deference ruling: how it could hurt veterans and the VA. Veteran.com. Updated July 9, 2024. Accessed October 21, 2024. https://veteran.com/scotus-chevron-deference-impact-va-veteran/
- Hersey LF. Lawmakers urge VA to reduce backlog, wait times on veterans claims for benefits. Stars & Stripes. June 27, 2024. Accessed October 21, 2024. https://www.stripes.com/veterans/2024-06-27/veterans-benefits-claims-backlog-pact-act-14315042.html
- Harper CJ. Give veterans the benefit of the doubt: Chevron, Auer, and the veteran’s canon. Harvard J Law Public Policy. 2019; 42(3):931-969. https://journals.law.harvard.edu/jlpp/wp-content/uploads/sites/90/2019/06/42_3-Full-Issue.pdf
- Fishgold v Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp, 328 US 275, 285 (1946).
As Veterans Day approaches, stores and restaurants will offer discounts and free meals to veterans. Children will write thank you letters, and citizens nationwide will raise flags to honor and thank veterans. We can never repay those who lost their life, health, or livelihood in defense of the nation. Since the American Revolution, and in gratitude for that incalculable debt, the US government, on behalf of the American public, has seen fit to grant a host of benefits and services to those who wore the uniform.2,3 Among the best known are health care, burial services, compensation and pensions, home loans, and the GI Bill.
Less recognized yet arguably essential for the fair and consistent provision of these entitlements is a legal principle: the veteran’s canon. A canon is a system of rules or maxims used to interpret legal instruments, such as statutes. They are not rules but serve as a “principle that guides the interpretation of the text.”4 Since I am not a lawyer, I will undoubtedly oversimplify this legal principle, but I hope to get enough right to explain why the veteran’s canon should matter to federal health care professionals.
At its core, the veteran’s canon means that when the US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) and a veteran have a legal dispute about VA benefits, the courts will give deference to the veteran. Underscoring that any ambiguity in the statute is resolved in the veteran’s favor, the canon is known in legal circles as the Gardner deference. This is a reference to a 1994 case in which a Korean War veteran underwent surgery in a VA facility for a herniated disc he alleged caused pain and weakness in his left lower extremity.5 Gardner argued that federal statutes 38 USC § 1151 underlying corresponding VA regulation 38 CFR § 3.358(c)(3) granted disability benefits to veterans injured during VA treatment. The VA denied the disability claim, contending the regulation restricted compensation to veterans whose injury was the fault of the VA; thus, the disability had to have been the result of negligent treatment or an unforeseen therapeutic accident.5
The case wound its way through various appeals boards and courts until the Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS) ruled that the statute’s context left no ambiguity, and that any care provided under VA auspices was covered under the statute. What is important for this column is that the justices opined that had ambiguity been present, it would have legally necessitated, “applying the rule that interpretive doubt is to be resolved in the veteran’s favor.”5 In Gardner’s case, the courts reaffirmed nearly 80 years of judicial precedent upholding the veteran’s canon.
Thirty years later, Rudisill v McDonough again questioned the veteran’s canon.6 Educational benefits, namely the GI Bill, were the issue in this case. Rudisill served during 3 different periods in the US Army, totaling 8 years. Two educational programs overlapped during Rudisill’s tenure in the military: the Montgomery GI Bill and Post-9/11 Veterans Educational Assistance Act. Rudisill had used a portion of his Montgomery benefits to fund his undergraduate education and now wished to use the more extensive Post-9/11 assistance to finance his graduate degree. Rudisill and the VA disagreed about when his combined benefits would be capped, either at 36 or 48 months. After working its way through appeals courts, SCOTUS was again called upon for judgment.
The justices found that Rudisill qualified under both programs and could use them in any order he wished up to the cap. The majority found no ambiguity in the statute; however, if interpretation was required, the majority of justices indicated that the veteran’s canon would have supported Rudisill. While this sounds like good news for veterans, 2 justices authored a dissenting opinion that questioned the constitutional grounding of the veteran’s canon, noting that the “canon appears to have developed almost by accident.”6 The minority opinion suggested that when the veteran’s canon allocates resources to pay for specific veteran benefits, other interests and groups are deprived of those same resources, resulting in potential inequity.7
The potential ethical import and clinical impact of striking down the veteran’s canon is serious. It is especially concerning given that in a recent case, the SCOTUS ruling struck down another legal interpretation that also benefited the VA and ultimately veterans: the Chevron deference.8 This precedent held that when a legal dispute arises about the meaning of a specific federal agency regulation or policy, the courts should defer to the federal agency’s presumably superior understanding of the matter. The principle places the locus of decision-making with the subject-matter experts of the respective agency rather than the courts.
Ironically, given the legislative purposes of both interpretive principles, their overturning would likely introduce much more uncertainty, variation, and unpredictability in cases involving veteran benefits. This is bad news for both veterans and the VA. Veterans might not prevail as often in court when they have a reasonable claim, leading to more aggressive challenges. In response, the VA would have a heavier and more costly burden of administrative proof to defend sound decisions.9 Recently, the VA has tried to reduce the backlog of claims. The inability to have legal recourse to Chevron or Gardener could result in even more delay in adjudicating veterans’ claims that enable them to access benefits and services, already an object of congressional pressure.10
Courts will continue to debate the issue with another judicial test of the canon on the current SCOTUS docket (Bufkin v McDonough).11 The veteran’s canon was put in place to equalize the power differential between the VA and the veteran: in administrative language, to make it more likely than not that the veteran would prevail when regulations were ambiguous. There are many legal and political rationales for veteran’s canon, including enabling veterans to file claims for service-connected illnesses. The veteran’s cannon helped Vietnam War-era veterans receive VA care while researchers were still studying the sequela of Agent Orange exposure. 12 The legislative purpose of the veteran’s canon is the same as that of all VA benefits and services commemorated on Veterans Day. As expressed by SCOTUS justices in the wake of World War II, the benefit statutes should be “liberally construed for the benefit of those who left private life to serve their country in its hour of greatest need.”13
As Veterans Day approaches, stores and restaurants will offer discounts and free meals to veterans. Children will write thank you letters, and citizens nationwide will raise flags to honor and thank veterans. We can never repay those who lost their life, health, or livelihood in defense of the nation. Since the American Revolution, and in gratitude for that incalculable debt, the US government, on behalf of the American public, has seen fit to grant a host of benefits and services to those who wore the uniform.2,3 Among the best known are health care, burial services, compensation and pensions, home loans, and the GI Bill.
Less recognized yet arguably essential for the fair and consistent provision of these entitlements is a legal principle: the veteran’s canon. A canon is a system of rules or maxims used to interpret legal instruments, such as statutes. They are not rules but serve as a “principle that guides the interpretation of the text.”4 Since I am not a lawyer, I will undoubtedly oversimplify this legal principle, but I hope to get enough right to explain why the veteran’s canon should matter to federal health care professionals.
At its core, the veteran’s canon means that when the US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) and a veteran have a legal dispute about VA benefits, the courts will give deference to the veteran. Underscoring that any ambiguity in the statute is resolved in the veteran’s favor, the canon is known in legal circles as the Gardner deference. This is a reference to a 1994 case in which a Korean War veteran underwent surgery in a VA facility for a herniated disc he alleged caused pain and weakness in his left lower extremity.5 Gardner argued that federal statutes 38 USC § 1151 underlying corresponding VA regulation 38 CFR § 3.358(c)(3) granted disability benefits to veterans injured during VA treatment. The VA denied the disability claim, contending the regulation restricted compensation to veterans whose injury was the fault of the VA; thus, the disability had to have been the result of negligent treatment or an unforeseen therapeutic accident.5
The case wound its way through various appeals boards and courts until the Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS) ruled that the statute’s context left no ambiguity, and that any care provided under VA auspices was covered under the statute. What is important for this column is that the justices opined that had ambiguity been present, it would have legally necessitated, “applying the rule that interpretive doubt is to be resolved in the veteran’s favor.”5 In Gardner’s case, the courts reaffirmed nearly 80 years of judicial precedent upholding the veteran’s canon.
Thirty years later, Rudisill v McDonough again questioned the veteran’s canon.6 Educational benefits, namely the GI Bill, were the issue in this case. Rudisill served during 3 different periods in the US Army, totaling 8 years. Two educational programs overlapped during Rudisill’s tenure in the military: the Montgomery GI Bill and Post-9/11 Veterans Educational Assistance Act. Rudisill had used a portion of his Montgomery benefits to fund his undergraduate education and now wished to use the more extensive Post-9/11 assistance to finance his graduate degree. Rudisill and the VA disagreed about when his combined benefits would be capped, either at 36 or 48 months. After working its way through appeals courts, SCOTUS was again called upon for judgment.
The justices found that Rudisill qualified under both programs and could use them in any order he wished up to the cap. The majority found no ambiguity in the statute; however, if interpretation was required, the majority of justices indicated that the veteran’s canon would have supported Rudisill. While this sounds like good news for veterans, 2 justices authored a dissenting opinion that questioned the constitutional grounding of the veteran’s canon, noting that the “canon appears to have developed almost by accident.”6 The minority opinion suggested that when the veteran’s canon allocates resources to pay for specific veteran benefits, other interests and groups are deprived of those same resources, resulting in potential inequity.7
The potential ethical import and clinical impact of striking down the veteran’s canon is serious. It is especially concerning given that in a recent case, the SCOTUS ruling struck down another legal interpretation that also benefited the VA and ultimately veterans: the Chevron deference.8 This precedent held that when a legal dispute arises about the meaning of a specific federal agency regulation or policy, the courts should defer to the federal agency’s presumably superior understanding of the matter. The principle places the locus of decision-making with the subject-matter experts of the respective agency rather than the courts.
Ironically, given the legislative purposes of both interpretive principles, their overturning would likely introduce much more uncertainty, variation, and unpredictability in cases involving veteran benefits. This is bad news for both veterans and the VA. Veterans might not prevail as often in court when they have a reasonable claim, leading to more aggressive challenges. In response, the VA would have a heavier and more costly burden of administrative proof to defend sound decisions.9 Recently, the VA has tried to reduce the backlog of claims. The inability to have legal recourse to Chevron or Gardener could result in even more delay in adjudicating veterans’ claims that enable them to access benefits and services, already an object of congressional pressure.10
Courts will continue to debate the issue with another judicial test of the canon on the current SCOTUS docket (Bufkin v McDonough).11 The veteran’s canon was put in place to equalize the power differential between the VA and the veteran: in administrative language, to make it more likely than not that the veteran would prevail when regulations were ambiguous. There are many legal and political rationales for veteran’s canon, including enabling veterans to file claims for service-connected illnesses. The veteran’s cannon helped Vietnam War-era veterans receive VA care while researchers were still studying the sequela of Agent Orange exposure. 12 The legislative purpose of the veteran’s canon is the same as that of all VA benefits and services commemorated on Veterans Day. As expressed by SCOTUS justices in the wake of World War II, the benefit statutes should be “liberally construed for the benefit of those who left private life to serve their country in its hour of greatest need.”13
- Henderson v Shinseki, 562 US. 428, 440-441 (2011).
- US Department of Veterans Affairs, National Veteran Outreach Office. The difference between Veterans Day and Memorial Day. October 30, 2023. Accessed October 21, 2024. https://news.va.gov/125549/difference-between-veterans-day-memorial-day/
- US Department of Veterans Affairs. VA history summary. Updated August 6, 2024. Accessed October 21, 2024. https://department.va.gov/history/history-overview
- Cornell Law School, Legal Information Institute. Canons of construction. Updated March 2022. Accessed October 21, 2024. https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/canons_of_construction
- Brown v Gardner, 513 US 115 (1994).
- Rudisill v McDonough, 601 US __ (2024).
- Hoover J. Justices will decide if vets are getting the ‘benefit of the doubt’. National Law Journal. April 30, 2024. Accessed October 21, 2024. https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/2024/04/30/justices-will-decide-if-vets-are-getting-the-benefit-of-the-doubt/
- Relentless, Inc. v Department of Commerce Docket # 22-219, January 17, 2024.
- Kime P. Two veterans will argue to Supreme Court that VA disability claims aren’t getting, ‘benefit of the doubt’. Military. com. October 15, 2024. Accessed October 21, 2024. https:// www.military.com/daily-news/2024/10/15/supreme-court-hears-case-questioning-vas-commitment-favoring-veterans-benefits-decisions.html
- Rehagen J. SCOTUS’s chevron deference ruling: how it could hurt veterans and the VA. Veteran.com. Updated July 9, 2024. Accessed October 21, 2024. https://veteran.com/scotus-chevron-deference-impact-va-veteran/
- Hersey LF. Lawmakers urge VA to reduce backlog, wait times on veterans claims for benefits. Stars & Stripes. June 27, 2024. Accessed October 21, 2024. https://www.stripes.com/veterans/2024-06-27/veterans-benefits-claims-backlog-pact-act-14315042.html
- Harper CJ. Give veterans the benefit of the doubt: Chevron, Auer, and the veteran’s canon. Harvard J Law Public Policy. 2019; 42(3):931-969. https://journals.law.harvard.edu/jlpp/wp-content/uploads/sites/90/2019/06/42_3-Full-Issue.pdf
- Fishgold v Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp, 328 US 275, 285 (1946).
- Henderson v Shinseki, 562 US. 428, 440-441 (2011).
- US Department of Veterans Affairs, National Veteran Outreach Office. The difference between Veterans Day and Memorial Day. October 30, 2023. Accessed October 21, 2024. https://news.va.gov/125549/difference-between-veterans-day-memorial-day/
- US Department of Veterans Affairs. VA history summary. Updated August 6, 2024. Accessed October 21, 2024. https://department.va.gov/history/history-overview
- Cornell Law School, Legal Information Institute. Canons of construction. Updated March 2022. Accessed October 21, 2024. https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/canons_of_construction
- Brown v Gardner, 513 US 115 (1994).
- Rudisill v McDonough, 601 US __ (2024).
- Hoover J. Justices will decide if vets are getting the ‘benefit of the doubt’. National Law Journal. April 30, 2024. Accessed October 21, 2024. https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/2024/04/30/justices-will-decide-if-vets-are-getting-the-benefit-of-the-doubt/
- Relentless, Inc. v Department of Commerce Docket # 22-219, January 17, 2024.
- Kime P. Two veterans will argue to Supreme Court that VA disability claims aren’t getting, ‘benefit of the doubt’. Military. com. October 15, 2024. Accessed October 21, 2024. https:// www.military.com/daily-news/2024/10/15/supreme-court-hears-case-questioning-vas-commitment-favoring-veterans-benefits-decisions.html
- Rehagen J. SCOTUS’s chevron deference ruling: how it could hurt veterans and the VA. Veteran.com. Updated July 9, 2024. Accessed October 21, 2024. https://veteran.com/scotus-chevron-deference-impact-va-veteran/
- Hersey LF. Lawmakers urge VA to reduce backlog, wait times on veterans claims for benefits. Stars & Stripes. June 27, 2024. Accessed October 21, 2024. https://www.stripes.com/veterans/2024-06-27/veterans-benefits-claims-backlog-pact-act-14315042.html
- Harper CJ. Give veterans the benefit of the doubt: Chevron, Auer, and the veteran’s canon. Harvard J Law Public Policy. 2019; 42(3):931-969. https://journals.law.harvard.edu/jlpp/wp-content/uploads/sites/90/2019/06/42_3-Full-Issue.pdf
- Fishgold v Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp, 328 US 275, 285 (1946).
The Veteran’s Canon Under Fire
The Veteran’s Canon Under Fire
The Rebuilding of Military Medicine
It is the neglect of timely repair that makes rebuilding necessary.
Richard Whately, economist and theologian (1787-1863)
US Congressional inquiry and media attention are so frequently directed at the trials and tribulations of the US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) that we forget the US Department of Defense (DoD) medical system also shares the federal practitioner space. The focus of the government and press recently has shifted to examine the weaknesses and woes of military medicine. This editorial reviews what that examination discovered about the decline of the DoD house of medicine, why it is in disrepair, proposals for its rebuilding, and reflects on what this trajectory can tell us about maintaining the structure of federal practice.
My father never tired of telling me that he and his medical colleagues returned from the Second World War with knowledge and skills gained in combat theaters that, in many respects, surpassed those of the civilian sector. Though he was biased as a career military physician and combat veteran, there is strong evidence backing the assertion that from World War I to Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, American military medicine has been the glory of the world.1
A November 2023 report from the DoD Office of the Inspector General (OIG) warned that military medicine was in trouble. The report’s emphasis on access and staffing problems that endanger the availability and quality of health care services will likely strike a chord with VA clinicians. The document is based on data from OIG reports, hotline calls, and audits from the last several years; however, the OIG acknowledges that it did not conduct on-the-ground investigations to confirm the findings.2
When we hear the term military medicine, many immediately think of active duty service members. However, the patient population of DoD is far larger and more diverse. The Military Health System (MHS) provides care to > 9.5 million beneficiaries, including dependents and retirees, veterans, civilian DoD employees, and even contractors. Those who most heavily rely on the MHS are individuals in uniform and their families are experiencing the greatest difficulty with accessing care.3 This includes crucial mental health treatment at a time when rates of military suicide continue to climb.4
The lack of access and dearth of health care practitioners (HCPs) spans both military facilities and the civilian clinics and hospitals where current and former service members and their dependents use the TRICARE beneficiary insurance. Reminiscent of recent challenges at the VA, DoD members are encountering long wait times and the frustrating bureaucracy of inefficient and, at times, inept referral networks. Additionally, many institutions and HCPs will not accept TRICARE because it pays less and has more paperwork than other insurance plans. What is worse, there is currently no governmental leverage to compel them to participate.
The lack of access and dearth of health care practitioners (HCPs) spans both military facilities and the civilian clinics and hospitals where current and former service members and their dependents use the TRICARE beneficiary insurance. Reminiscent of recent challenges at the VA, DoD members are encountering long wait times and the frustrating bureaucracy of inefficient and, at times, inept referral networks. Additionally, many institutions and HCPs will not accept TRICARE because it pays less and has more paperwork than other insurance plans. What is worse, there is currently no governmental leverage to compel them to participate.
As with both the VA and civilian health care spheres, rural areas are the most impacted. Resource shortfalls adversely affect all aspects of care, especially the highly paid specialties like gastroenterology and urology, as well as primary care practitioners essential to ensure the health of military families. The deficits are widespread—all branches report similar obstacles to providing responsive, appropriate care. As if this was not enough to complete the mirror image of the VA’s struggles, there is a rising tide of complaints about the military’s electronic health record system.5 How did the preeminent MHS so rapidly decay? Experts in and out of uniform offer several explanations.
As with most forms of managed care, the need to cut costs drove the Pentagon to send military members and dependents to civilian health care systems to have their medical needs addressed. However, this outsourcing strategy was based on a false assumption that the community had enough capacity to deliver services to the many beneficiaries needing them. Nearly every sector of contemporary American medicine is experiencing a drastic shortage of HCPs. Though the resource allocation problems began before the pandemic, COVID-19 only exacerbated and accelerated them.6
This downsizing of military hospitals and clinics led to another predictable and seemingly unheeded consequence. A decrease in complex cases (particularly surgical cases) led to a reduction in the skills of military HCPs and a further flight of highly trained specialists who require a reasonable volume of complicated cases to retain and sharpen their expertise. The losses of those experienced clinicians further drain the pool of specialists the military can muster to sustain the readiness of troops for war and the health of their families in peace.7
The OIG recommended that the Defense Health Agency address MHS staffing and access deficiencies noted in its report, including identifying poorly performing TRICARE specialty networks and requiring them to meet their access obligation.2 As is customary, the OIG asked for DoD comment. It is unclear whether the DoD responded to that formal request; however, it is more certain it heard the message the OIG and beneficiaries conveyed. In December 2023, the Deputy Secretary of the DoD published a memorandum ordering the stabilization of the MHS. It instructs the MHS to address each of the 3 problem areas outlined in this article: (1) to reclaim patients and beneficiaries who had been outsourced or whose resources were constrained to seek care in the community; (2) to improve access to and staffing for military hospitals and clinics for active duty members and families; and (3) to restore and maintain the military readiness of the clinical forces.8 Several other documents have been issued that emphasize the crucial need to recruit and retain qualified HCPs and support staff if these aims are to be actualized, including the 2024 to 2029 MHS strategic plan.9 As the VA and US Public Health Service know, the current health care environment may be a near impossible mission.10 Although what we know from the history of military medicine is that they have a track record of achieving the impossible.
- Barr J, Podolsky SH. A national medical response to crisis - the legacy of World War II. N Engl J Med. 2020;383(7):613-615. doi:10.1056/NEJMp2008512
- US Department of Defense, Office of the Inspector General. Management advisory: concerns with access to care and staffing shortages in the Military Health System. November 29, 2023. Accessed August 26, 2024. https://www.dodig.mil/reports.html/Article/3602650/management-advisory-concerns-with-access-to-care-and-staffing-shortages-in-the/
- Management advisory: concerns with access to care and staffing shortages in the Military Health System. News release. US Department of Defense, Office of the Inspector General. November 29, 2023. Accessed August 26, 2024. https://www.dodig.mil/In-the-Spotlight/Article/3602662/press-release-management-advisory-concerns-with-access-to-care-and-staffing-sho
- US Department of Defense. Annual report on suicide in the military: calendar year 2022. Accessed August 26, 2024. https://www.dspo.mil/Portals/113/Documents/ARSM_CY22.pdf
- American Hospital Association. Strengthening the Health Care Work Force. November 2021. Accessed August 26, 2024. https://www.aha.org/system/files/media/file/2021/05/fact-sheet-workforce-infrastructure-0521.pdf
- Ziezulewicz G. DOD watchdog report warns of issues across military health system. Military Times. December 6, 2023. Accessed August 26, 2024. https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2023/12/07/dod-watchdog-report-warns-of-issues-across-military-health-care-system/
- Lawrence Q. It’s time to stop downsizing health care, the Pentagon says. This couple can’t wait. National Public Radio. April 3, 2024. Accessed August 26, 2024. https://www.npr.org/transcripts/1240724195
- Mincher R. Military Health System stabilization: rebuilding health care access is critical to patient’s well-being. January 22, 2024. Accessed August 26, 2024. https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/article/3652092/military-health-system-stabilization-rebuilding-health-care-access-is-critical/
- US Department of Defense, Defense Health Agency. Military Health System strategy fiscal years 2024-2029. Accessed August 26, 2024. https://www.health.mil/Reference-Center/Publications/2023/12/15/MHS_Strategic_Plan_FY24_29
- Jowers K. Pentagon plans to fix ‘chronically understaffed’ medical facilities. Military Times. January 25, 2024. Accessed August 26, 2024. https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2024/01/25/pentagon-plans-to-fix-chronically-understaffed-medical-facilities/
It is the neglect of timely repair that makes rebuilding necessary.
Richard Whately, economist and theologian (1787-1863)
US Congressional inquiry and media attention are so frequently directed at the trials and tribulations of the US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) that we forget the US Department of Defense (DoD) medical system also shares the federal practitioner space. The focus of the government and press recently has shifted to examine the weaknesses and woes of military medicine. This editorial reviews what that examination discovered about the decline of the DoD house of medicine, why it is in disrepair, proposals for its rebuilding, and reflects on what this trajectory can tell us about maintaining the structure of federal practice.
My father never tired of telling me that he and his medical colleagues returned from the Second World War with knowledge and skills gained in combat theaters that, in many respects, surpassed those of the civilian sector. Though he was biased as a career military physician and combat veteran, there is strong evidence backing the assertion that from World War I to Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, American military medicine has been the glory of the world.1
A November 2023 report from the DoD Office of the Inspector General (OIG) warned that military medicine was in trouble. The report’s emphasis on access and staffing problems that endanger the availability and quality of health care services will likely strike a chord with VA clinicians. The document is based on data from OIG reports, hotline calls, and audits from the last several years; however, the OIG acknowledges that it did not conduct on-the-ground investigations to confirm the findings.2
When we hear the term military medicine, many immediately think of active duty service members. However, the patient population of DoD is far larger and more diverse. The Military Health System (MHS) provides care to > 9.5 million beneficiaries, including dependents and retirees, veterans, civilian DoD employees, and even contractors. Those who most heavily rely on the MHS are individuals in uniform and their families are experiencing the greatest difficulty with accessing care.3 This includes crucial mental health treatment at a time when rates of military suicide continue to climb.4
The lack of access and dearth of health care practitioners (HCPs) spans both military facilities and the civilian clinics and hospitals where current and former service members and their dependents use the TRICARE beneficiary insurance. Reminiscent of recent challenges at the VA, DoD members are encountering long wait times and the frustrating bureaucracy of inefficient and, at times, inept referral networks. Additionally, many institutions and HCPs will not accept TRICARE because it pays less and has more paperwork than other insurance plans. What is worse, there is currently no governmental leverage to compel them to participate.
The lack of access and dearth of health care practitioners (HCPs) spans both military facilities and the civilian clinics and hospitals where current and former service members and their dependents use the TRICARE beneficiary insurance. Reminiscent of recent challenges at the VA, DoD members are encountering long wait times and the frustrating bureaucracy of inefficient and, at times, inept referral networks. Additionally, many institutions and HCPs will not accept TRICARE because it pays less and has more paperwork than other insurance plans. What is worse, there is currently no governmental leverage to compel them to participate.
As with both the VA and civilian health care spheres, rural areas are the most impacted. Resource shortfalls adversely affect all aspects of care, especially the highly paid specialties like gastroenterology and urology, as well as primary care practitioners essential to ensure the health of military families. The deficits are widespread—all branches report similar obstacles to providing responsive, appropriate care. As if this was not enough to complete the mirror image of the VA’s struggles, there is a rising tide of complaints about the military’s electronic health record system.5 How did the preeminent MHS so rapidly decay? Experts in and out of uniform offer several explanations.
As with most forms of managed care, the need to cut costs drove the Pentagon to send military members and dependents to civilian health care systems to have their medical needs addressed. However, this outsourcing strategy was based on a false assumption that the community had enough capacity to deliver services to the many beneficiaries needing them. Nearly every sector of contemporary American medicine is experiencing a drastic shortage of HCPs. Though the resource allocation problems began before the pandemic, COVID-19 only exacerbated and accelerated them.6
This downsizing of military hospitals and clinics led to another predictable and seemingly unheeded consequence. A decrease in complex cases (particularly surgical cases) led to a reduction in the skills of military HCPs and a further flight of highly trained specialists who require a reasonable volume of complicated cases to retain and sharpen their expertise. The losses of those experienced clinicians further drain the pool of specialists the military can muster to sustain the readiness of troops for war and the health of their families in peace.7
The OIG recommended that the Defense Health Agency address MHS staffing and access deficiencies noted in its report, including identifying poorly performing TRICARE specialty networks and requiring them to meet their access obligation.2 As is customary, the OIG asked for DoD comment. It is unclear whether the DoD responded to that formal request; however, it is more certain it heard the message the OIG and beneficiaries conveyed. In December 2023, the Deputy Secretary of the DoD published a memorandum ordering the stabilization of the MHS. It instructs the MHS to address each of the 3 problem areas outlined in this article: (1) to reclaim patients and beneficiaries who had been outsourced or whose resources were constrained to seek care in the community; (2) to improve access to and staffing for military hospitals and clinics for active duty members and families; and (3) to restore and maintain the military readiness of the clinical forces.8 Several other documents have been issued that emphasize the crucial need to recruit and retain qualified HCPs and support staff if these aims are to be actualized, including the 2024 to 2029 MHS strategic plan.9 As the VA and US Public Health Service know, the current health care environment may be a near impossible mission.10 Although what we know from the history of military medicine is that they have a track record of achieving the impossible.
It is the neglect of timely repair that makes rebuilding necessary.
Richard Whately, economist and theologian (1787-1863)
US Congressional inquiry and media attention are so frequently directed at the trials and tribulations of the US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) that we forget the US Department of Defense (DoD) medical system also shares the federal practitioner space. The focus of the government and press recently has shifted to examine the weaknesses and woes of military medicine. This editorial reviews what that examination discovered about the decline of the DoD house of medicine, why it is in disrepair, proposals for its rebuilding, and reflects on what this trajectory can tell us about maintaining the structure of federal practice.
My father never tired of telling me that he and his medical colleagues returned from the Second World War with knowledge and skills gained in combat theaters that, in many respects, surpassed those of the civilian sector. Though he was biased as a career military physician and combat veteran, there is strong evidence backing the assertion that from World War I to Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, American military medicine has been the glory of the world.1
A November 2023 report from the DoD Office of the Inspector General (OIG) warned that military medicine was in trouble. The report’s emphasis on access and staffing problems that endanger the availability and quality of health care services will likely strike a chord with VA clinicians. The document is based on data from OIG reports, hotline calls, and audits from the last several years; however, the OIG acknowledges that it did not conduct on-the-ground investigations to confirm the findings.2
When we hear the term military medicine, many immediately think of active duty service members. However, the patient population of DoD is far larger and more diverse. The Military Health System (MHS) provides care to > 9.5 million beneficiaries, including dependents and retirees, veterans, civilian DoD employees, and even contractors. Those who most heavily rely on the MHS are individuals in uniform and their families are experiencing the greatest difficulty with accessing care.3 This includes crucial mental health treatment at a time when rates of military suicide continue to climb.4
The lack of access and dearth of health care practitioners (HCPs) spans both military facilities and the civilian clinics and hospitals where current and former service members and their dependents use the TRICARE beneficiary insurance. Reminiscent of recent challenges at the VA, DoD members are encountering long wait times and the frustrating bureaucracy of inefficient and, at times, inept referral networks. Additionally, many institutions and HCPs will not accept TRICARE because it pays less and has more paperwork than other insurance plans. What is worse, there is currently no governmental leverage to compel them to participate.
The lack of access and dearth of health care practitioners (HCPs) spans both military facilities and the civilian clinics and hospitals where current and former service members and their dependents use the TRICARE beneficiary insurance. Reminiscent of recent challenges at the VA, DoD members are encountering long wait times and the frustrating bureaucracy of inefficient and, at times, inept referral networks. Additionally, many institutions and HCPs will not accept TRICARE because it pays less and has more paperwork than other insurance plans. What is worse, there is currently no governmental leverage to compel them to participate.
As with both the VA and civilian health care spheres, rural areas are the most impacted. Resource shortfalls adversely affect all aspects of care, especially the highly paid specialties like gastroenterology and urology, as well as primary care practitioners essential to ensure the health of military families. The deficits are widespread—all branches report similar obstacles to providing responsive, appropriate care. As if this was not enough to complete the mirror image of the VA’s struggles, there is a rising tide of complaints about the military’s electronic health record system.5 How did the preeminent MHS so rapidly decay? Experts in and out of uniform offer several explanations.
As with most forms of managed care, the need to cut costs drove the Pentagon to send military members and dependents to civilian health care systems to have their medical needs addressed. However, this outsourcing strategy was based on a false assumption that the community had enough capacity to deliver services to the many beneficiaries needing them. Nearly every sector of contemporary American medicine is experiencing a drastic shortage of HCPs. Though the resource allocation problems began before the pandemic, COVID-19 only exacerbated and accelerated them.6
This downsizing of military hospitals and clinics led to another predictable and seemingly unheeded consequence. A decrease in complex cases (particularly surgical cases) led to a reduction in the skills of military HCPs and a further flight of highly trained specialists who require a reasonable volume of complicated cases to retain and sharpen their expertise. The losses of those experienced clinicians further drain the pool of specialists the military can muster to sustain the readiness of troops for war and the health of their families in peace.7
The OIG recommended that the Defense Health Agency address MHS staffing and access deficiencies noted in its report, including identifying poorly performing TRICARE specialty networks and requiring them to meet their access obligation.2 As is customary, the OIG asked for DoD comment. It is unclear whether the DoD responded to that formal request; however, it is more certain it heard the message the OIG and beneficiaries conveyed. In December 2023, the Deputy Secretary of the DoD published a memorandum ordering the stabilization of the MHS. It instructs the MHS to address each of the 3 problem areas outlined in this article: (1) to reclaim patients and beneficiaries who had been outsourced or whose resources were constrained to seek care in the community; (2) to improve access to and staffing for military hospitals and clinics for active duty members and families; and (3) to restore and maintain the military readiness of the clinical forces.8 Several other documents have been issued that emphasize the crucial need to recruit and retain qualified HCPs and support staff if these aims are to be actualized, including the 2024 to 2029 MHS strategic plan.9 As the VA and US Public Health Service know, the current health care environment may be a near impossible mission.10 Although what we know from the history of military medicine is that they have a track record of achieving the impossible.
- Barr J, Podolsky SH. A national medical response to crisis - the legacy of World War II. N Engl J Med. 2020;383(7):613-615. doi:10.1056/NEJMp2008512
- US Department of Defense, Office of the Inspector General. Management advisory: concerns with access to care and staffing shortages in the Military Health System. November 29, 2023. Accessed August 26, 2024. https://www.dodig.mil/reports.html/Article/3602650/management-advisory-concerns-with-access-to-care-and-staffing-shortages-in-the/
- Management advisory: concerns with access to care and staffing shortages in the Military Health System. News release. US Department of Defense, Office of the Inspector General. November 29, 2023. Accessed August 26, 2024. https://www.dodig.mil/In-the-Spotlight/Article/3602662/press-release-management-advisory-concerns-with-access-to-care-and-staffing-sho
- US Department of Defense. Annual report on suicide in the military: calendar year 2022. Accessed August 26, 2024. https://www.dspo.mil/Portals/113/Documents/ARSM_CY22.pdf
- American Hospital Association. Strengthening the Health Care Work Force. November 2021. Accessed August 26, 2024. https://www.aha.org/system/files/media/file/2021/05/fact-sheet-workforce-infrastructure-0521.pdf
- Ziezulewicz G. DOD watchdog report warns of issues across military health system. Military Times. December 6, 2023. Accessed August 26, 2024. https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2023/12/07/dod-watchdog-report-warns-of-issues-across-military-health-care-system/
- Lawrence Q. It’s time to stop downsizing health care, the Pentagon says. This couple can’t wait. National Public Radio. April 3, 2024. Accessed August 26, 2024. https://www.npr.org/transcripts/1240724195
- Mincher R. Military Health System stabilization: rebuilding health care access is critical to patient’s well-being. January 22, 2024. Accessed August 26, 2024. https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/article/3652092/military-health-system-stabilization-rebuilding-health-care-access-is-critical/
- US Department of Defense, Defense Health Agency. Military Health System strategy fiscal years 2024-2029. Accessed August 26, 2024. https://www.health.mil/Reference-Center/Publications/2023/12/15/MHS_Strategic_Plan_FY24_29
- Jowers K. Pentagon plans to fix ‘chronically understaffed’ medical facilities. Military Times. January 25, 2024. Accessed August 26, 2024. https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2024/01/25/pentagon-plans-to-fix-chronically-understaffed-medical-facilities/
- Barr J, Podolsky SH. A national medical response to crisis - the legacy of World War II. N Engl J Med. 2020;383(7):613-615. doi:10.1056/NEJMp2008512
- US Department of Defense, Office of the Inspector General. Management advisory: concerns with access to care and staffing shortages in the Military Health System. November 29, 2023. Accessed August 26, 2024. https://www.dodig.mil/reports.html/Article/3602650/management-advisory-concerns-with-access-to-care-and-staffing-shortages-in-the/
- Management advisory: concerns with access to care and staffing shortages in the Military Health System. News release. US Department of Defense, Office of the Inspector General. November 29, 2023. Accessed August 26, 2024. https://www.dodig.mil/In-the-Spotlight/Article/3602662/press-release-management-advisory-concerns-with-access-to-care-and-staffing-sho
- US Department of Defense. Annual report on suicide in the military: calendar year 2022. Accessed August 26, 2024. https://www.dspo.mil/Portals/113/Documents/ARSM_CY22.pdf
- American Hospital Association. Strengthening the Health Care Work Force. November 2021. Accessed August 26, 2024. https://www.aha.org/system/files/media/file/2021/05/fact-sheet-workforce-infrastructure-0521.pdf
- Ziezulewicz G. DOD watchdog report warns of issues across military health system. Military Times. December 6, 2023. Accessed August 26, 2024. https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2023/12/07/dod-watchdog-report-warns-of-issues-across-military-health-care-system/
- Lawrence Q. It’s time to stop downsizing health care, the Pentagon says. This couple can’t wait. National Public Radio. April 3, 2024. Accessed August 26, 2024. https://www.npr.org/transcripts/1240724195
- Mincher R. Military Health System stabilization: rebuilding health care access is critical to patient’s well-being. January 22, 2024. Accessed August 26, 2024. https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/article/3652092/military-health-system-stabilization-rebuilding-health-care-access-is-critical/
- US Department of Defense, Defense Health Agency. Military Health System strategy fiscal years 2024-2029. Accessed August 26, 2024. https://www.health.mil/Reference-Center/Publications/2023/12/15/MHS_Strategic_Plan_FY24_29
- Jowers K. Pentagon plans to fix ‘chronically understaffed’ medical facilities. Military Times. January 25, 2024. Accessed August 26, 2024. https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2024/01/25/pentagon-plans-to-fix-chronically-understaffed-medical-facilities/
Trust in a Vial
On December 11, 2020, the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) delivered the holiday gift America was waiting for—approval of the first COVID-19 vaccine. Following the recommendation of its expert advisory panel, the FDA issued its opening emergency use authorization (EUA) for the Pfizer and BioNTech product to be distributed and administered across the country.1 A week after that historic announcement, the FDA issued an EUA to Moderna for a second COVID-19 vaccine.2
An EUA is a misunderstood concept that, like the development of the vaccine itself, appears almost like a magical federal deliverance to a nation at a time when almost every other public health effort has floundered. An EUA is a regulatory process to enable a public health emergency response with medical countermeasures including not only vaccines, but also medications. Earlier in 2020, hydroxychloroquine and remdesivir each received EUAs for treating patients with COVID-19.3 The EUA for hydroxychloroquine was later revoked when more data raised concerns for its efficacy.4 EUAs do not mean the drugs are experimental or that everyone receiving them is participating in a research trial; however, for the sake of safety and science, data continue to be collected and analyzed. Issuance of an EUA indicates that after rigorous examination and an independent advisory board review of data submitted by the manufacturer, the FDA has determined the product and situation meet key criteria: (1) There is a public health emergency that threatens health and life and requires expedited procedures; (2) there are no extant approved products able to treat or prevent the disease; and (3) the known and potential benefits of the product outweigh the known and potential risks.5
The public and even the professional press have celebrated the arrival of this technologic triumph over a virus that had vanquished staggering numbers of lives and livelihoods. Much of the media coverage aptly chose the word “hope” to capture the significance of this unprecedented accomplishment for which so many millions yearned. A Google search for “hope” on the morning of December 20, yielded 339,000,000 results. For example, a headline especially salient for Federal Practitioner readers from the New York Times read, “‘A Shot of Hope’ What the Vaccine is like for Frontline Doctors and Nurses.”6
I want to briefly argue why even though I believe hope in and for the vaccine is desperately needed if we are to survive this long, dark winter, trust in the vaccine can actually usher in the warmth of economic recovery and the light of saved lives. Trust is crucial in 3 main areas if the awe-inspiring hope of the vaccine the EUAs codify is to be fulfilled. The venerable moral and civic virtue of trust has been trivialized and commercialized mostly mentioned in advertising for insurance or real estate companies. Medical virtue-ethicists Edmund Pellegrino and David Thomasma describe trust as the binding force that keeps civilization intact. “Trust is ineradicable in human relationships. Without we could not live in society or attain even the rudiments of a fulfilling life, they explain. “Without trust we could not anticipate the future, and we would therefore be paralyzed into inaction. Yet to trust and entrust is to become vulnerable and dependent on the good will and motivations of those we trust. Trust, ineradicable as it is, is also always problematic.”7
The first area where that trust is the hardest to secure is in the federal government, the actions and messages of which have seemed so inconstant, unjust, and deceptive to many. For enough citizens to roll up their sleeves, they must believe the outgoing and the incoming administrations and legislators can make rational plans translated into sound public health policy that place the good of humanity above other interests and then mobilize the resources of the country to deliver that good with consistency, fairness, and transparency.
The second area is trust in medical science. Long before COVID-19, American attitudes toward vaccines reflected reasonable fears and ridiculous conspiracy theories—both of which are serious obstacles to the breadth of immunization required to achieve herd immunity. Ordinary people must believe that the health care professionals and scientists at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the FDA will never compromise safety for political expediency. Recent polls have shown an increase in the percentage of the population willing to consider vaccination. A December Gallop poll found that 63% of Americans were willing to be vaccinated for COVID-19.8 To raise those numbers high enough to approach herd immunity will require Americans to believe that the scientists who discover the vaccines and the companies that develop them have placed people above profit and ranked the safety of society above individual scientific renown.
Groups that have been the historic objects of exploitation in research and contemporary disparities in health care understandably have more distrust of science and medicine. While public health officials insist that they have developed a system of vaccine distribution that is equitable and prioritizes the sick and old and those who care for them before the rich and powerful, we should not be surprised that our communication of this assurance is viewed with skepticism. As a recent Medscape article advised,
Third we must trust in our fellow citizens to maintain the public health measures of social distancing and mask wearing even after there is widespread vaccination. If we are to reap the benefits of a safe and effective vaccine, we must be a community of immunity, not just isolated inoculated individuals. We as health care practitioners must do all we can to educate the public that the adverse reactions to the vaccine so prominently featured in the media are expected with any new and complex biological product and do not signal risk that outweighs the deadliness of the virus.10
Fourth, and finally, we must trust in ourselves as health care professionals and administrators. We in the DoD, VA, and PHS have the knowledge and skills to endure the onslaught of pain and suffering we will all experience in one way or another in these next long months. We must believe that our courage and compassion can turn a vaccine into vaccinations sufficient to relieve the COVID-19 siege of our hospitals and intensive care units. When that day comes, hope will have been a plan we could trust.
1. US Food and Drug Administration. FDA take key action in fight against COVID-19 by issuing emergency use authorization for first COVID-19 vaccine [press release]. Published December 11, 2020. Accessed December 22, 2020. https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/fda-takes-key-action-fight-against-covid-19-issuing-emergency-use-authorization-first-covid-19
2. US Food and Drug Administration. FDA takes additional action in fight against COVID-19 by Issuing emergency use authorization for second COVID-19 vaccine [press release]. Published December 18, 2020. Accessed December 22, 2020. https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/fda-takes-additional-action-fight-against-covid-19-issuing-emergency-use-authorization-second-covid
3. US Food and Drug Administration. FDA approves first treatment for COVID-19 [press release]. Published October 22, 2020. Accessed December 20, 2020. https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/fda-approves-first-treatment-covid-19
4. US Food and Drug Administration. Coronavirus (COVID-19) update: FDA revokes emergency use authorization for chloroquine and hydroxychloroquine [press release]. Published June 15, 2020. Accessed December 22, 2020. https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/coronavirus-covid-19-update-fda-revokes-emergency-use-authorization-chloroquine-and
5. US Food and Drug Administration. Emergency use authorization for vaccines explained. Updated November 20, 2020. Accessed December 22, 2020. https://www.fda.gov/vaccines-blood-biologics/vaccines/emergency-use-authorization-vaccines-explained
6. Healy J, Tompkins L, Burch ADS. ‘A shot of hope’: what the vaccine is like for frontline doctors and nurses. New York Times. Updated December 17, 2020. Accessed December 22, 2020. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/14/us/coronavirus-vaccine-doctors-nurses.html
7. Pellegrino E, Thomasma DC. The Virtues in Medical Practice . New York: Oxford University Press; 1993:65.
8. Brenan M. Willingness to get Covid-19 vaccine ticks up to 63% in the U.S. Published December 8, 2020. Accessed December 22, 2020. https://news.gallup.com/poll/327425/willingness-covid-vaccine-ticks.aspx
9. Eldred SM. Trusted messengers may help disenfranchised communities overcome vaccine hesitancy. Published December 17, 2020. Accessed December 22, 2020. https://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/942847
10. Chiu A. ‘Absolutely normal’: Covid vaccine side effects are not reason to avoid the shots, doctors say. Washington Post. Published December 3, 2020. Accessed December 22, 2020. https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/wellness/vaccine-side-effects-covid/2020/12/02/55bebac0-342c-11eb-8d38-6aea1adb3839_story.html
On December 11, 2020, the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) delivered the holiday gift America was waiting for—approval of the first COVID-19 vaccine. Following the recommendation of its expert advisory panel, the FDA issued its opening emergency use authorization (EUA) for the Pfizer and BioNTech product to be distributed and administered across the country.1 A week after that historic announcement, the FDA issued an EUA to Moderna for a second COVID-19 vaccine.2
An EUA is a misunderstood concept that, like the development of the vaccine itself, appears almost like a magical federal deliverance to a nation at a time when almost every other public health effort has floundered. An EUA is a regulatory process to enable a public health emergency response with medical countermeasures including not only vaccines, but also medications. Earlier in 2020, hydroxychloroquine and remdesivir each received EUAs for treating patients with COVID-19.3 The EUA for hydroxychloroquine was later revoked when more data raised concerns for its efficacy.4 EUAs do not mean the drugs are experimental or that everyone receiving them is participating in a research trial; however, for the sake of safety and science, data continue to be collected and analyzed. Issuance of an EUA indicates that after rigorous examination and an independent advisory board review of data submitted by the manufacturer, the FDA has determined the product and situation meet key criteria: (1) There is a public health emergency that threatens health and life and requires expedited procedures; (2) there are no extant approved products able to treat or prevent the disease; and (3) the known and potential benefits of the product outweigh the known and potential risks.5
The public and even the professional press have celebrated the arrival of this technologic triumph over a virus that had vanquished staggering numbers of lives and livelihoods. Much of the media coverage aptly chose the word “hope” to capture the significance of this unprecedented accomplishment for which so many millions yearned. A Google search for “hope” on the morning of December 20, yielded 339,000,000 results. For example, a headline especially salient for Federal Practitioner readers from the New York Times read, “‘A Shot of Hope’ What the Vaccine is like for Frontline Doctors and Nurses.”6
I want to briefly argue why even though I believe hope in and for the vaccine is desperately needed if we are to survive this long, dark winter, trust in the vaccine can actually usher in the warmth of economic recovery and the light of saved lives. Trust is crucial in 3 main areas if the awe-inspiring hope of the vaccine the EUAs codify is to be fulfilled. The venerable moral and civic virtue of trust has been trivialized and commercialized mostly mentioned in advertising for insurance or real estate companies. Medical virtue-ethicists Edmund Pellegrino and David Thomasma describe trust as the binding force that keeps civilization intact. “Trust is ineradicable in human relationships. Without we could not live in society or attain even the rudiments of a fulfilling life, they explain. “Without trust we could not anticipate the future, and we would therefore be paralyzed into inaction. Yet to trust and entrust is to become vulnerable and dependent on the good will and motivations of those we trust. Trust, ineradicable as it is, is also always problematic.”7
The first area where that trust is the hardest to secure is in the federal government, the actions and messages of which have seemed so inconstant, unjust, and deceptive to many. For enough citizens to roll up their sleeves, they must believe the outgoing and the incoming administrations and legislators can make rational plans translated into sound public health policy that place the good of humanity above other interests and then mobilize the resources of the country to deliver that good with consistency, fairness, and transparency.
The second area is trust in medical science. Long before COVID-19, American attitudes toward vaccines reflected reasonable fears and ridiculous conspiracy theories—both of which are serious obstacles to the breadth of immunization required to achieve herd immunity. Ordinary people must believe that the health care professionals and scientists at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the FDA will never compromise safety for political expediency. Recent polls have shown an increase in the percentage of the population willing to consider vaccination. A December Gallop poll found that 63% of Americans were willing to be vaccinated for COVID-19.8 To raise those numbers high enough to approach herd immunity will require Americans to believe that the scientists who discover the vaccines and the companies that develop them have placed people above profit and ranked the safety of society above individual scientific renown.
Groups that have been the historic objects of exploitation in research and contemporary disparities in health care understandably have more distrust of science and medicine. While public health officials insist that they have developed a system of vaccine distribution that is equitable and prioritizes the sick and old and those who care for them before the rich and powerful, we should not be surprised that our communication of this assurance is viewed with skepticism. As a recent Medscape article advised,
Third we must trust in our fellow citizens to maintain the public health measures of social distancing and mask wearing even after there is widespread vaccination. If we are to reap the benefits of a safe and effective vaccine, we must be a community of immunity, not just isolated inoculated individuals. We as health care practitioners must do all we can to educate the public that the adverse reactions to the vaccine so prominently featured in the media are expected with any new and complex biological product and do not signal risk that outweighs the deadliness of the virus.10
Fourth, and finally, we must trust in ourselves as health care professionals and administrators. We in the DoD, VA, and PHS have the knowledge and skills to endure the onslaught of pain and suffering we will all experience in one way or another in these next long months. We must believe that our courage and compassion can turn a vaccine into vaccinations sufficient to relieve the COVID-19 siege of our hospitals and intensive care units. When that day comes, hope will have been a plan we could trust.
On December 11, 2020, the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) delivered the holiday gift America was waiting for—approval of the first COVID-19 vaccine. Following the recommendation of its expert advisory panel, the FDA issued its opening emergency use authorization (EUA) for the Pfizer and BioNTech product to be distributed and administered across the country.1 A week after that historic announcement, the FDA issued an EUA to Moderna for a second COVID-19 vaccine.2
An EUA is a misunderstood concept that, like the development of the vaccine itself, appears almost like a magical federal deliverance to a nation at a time when almost every other public health effort has floundered. An EUA is a regulatory process to enable a public health emergency response with medical countermeasures including not only vaccines, but also medications. Earlier in 2020, hydroxychloroquine and remdesivir each received EUAs for treating patients with COVID-19.3 The EUA for hydroxychloroquine was later revoked when more data raised concerns for its efficacy.4 EUAs do not mean the drugs are experimental or that everyone receiving them is participating in a research trial; however, for the sake of safety and science, data continue to be collected and analyzed. Issuance of an EUA indicates that after rigorous examination and an independent advisory board review of data submitted by the manufacturer, the FDA has determined the product and situation meet key criteria: (1) There is a public health emergency that threatens health and life and requires expedited procedures; (2) there are no extant approved products able to treat or prevent the disease; and (3) the known and potential benefits of the product outweigh the known and potential risks.5
The public and even the professional press have celebrated the arrival of this technologic triumph over a virus that had vanquished staggering numbers of lives and livelihoods. Much of the media coverage aptly chose the word “hope” to capture the significance of this unprecedented accomplishment for which so many millions yearned. A Google search for “hope” on the morning of December 20, yielded 339,000,000 results. For example, a headline especially salient for Federal Practitioner readers from the New York Times read, “‘A Shot of Hope’ What the Vaccine is like for Frontline Doctors and Nurses.”6
I want to briefly argue why even though I believe hope in and for the vaccine is desperately needed if we are to survive this long, dark winter, trust in the vaccine can actually usher in the warmth of economic recovery and the light of saved lives. Trust is crucial in 3 main areas if the awe-inspiring hope of the vaccine the EUAs codify is to be fulfilled. The venerable moral and civic virtue of trust has been trivialized and commercialized mostly mentioned in advertising for insurance or real estate companies. Medical virtue-ethicists Edmund Pellegrino and David Thomasma describe trust as the binding force that keeps civilization intact. “Trust is ineradicable in human relationships. Without we could not live in society or attain even the rudiments of a fulfilling life, they explain. “Without trust we could not anticipate the future, and we would therefore be paralyzed into inaction. Yet to trust and entrust is to become vulnerable and dependent on the good will and motivations of those we trust. Trust, ineradicable as it is, is also always problematic.”7
The first area where that trust is the hardest to secure is in the federal government, the actions and messages of which have seemed so inconstant, unjust, and deceptive to many. For enough citizens to roll up their sleeves, they must believe the outgoing and the incoming administrations and legislators can make rational plans translated into sound public health policy that place the good of humanity above other interests and then mobilize the resources of the country to deliver that good with consistency, fairness, and transparency.
The second area is trust in medical science. Long before COVID-19, American attitudes toward vaccines reflected reasonable fears and ridiculous conspiracy theories—both of which are serious obstacles to the breadth of immunization required to achieve herd immunity. Ordinary people must believe that the health care professionals and scientists at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the FDA will never compromise safety for political expediency. Recent polls have shown an increase in the percentage of the population willing to consider vaccination. A December Gallop poll found that 63% of Americans were willing to be vaccinated for COVID-19.8 To raise those numbers high enough to approach herd immunity will require Americans to believe that the scientists who discover the vaccines and the companies that develop them have placed people above profit and ranked the safety of society above individual scientific renown.
Groups that have been the historic objects of exploitation in research and contemporary disparities in health care understandably have more distrust of science and medicine. While public health officials insist that they have developed a system of vaccine distribution that is equitable and prioritizes the sick and old and those who care for them before the rich and powerful, we should not be surprised that our communication of this assurance is viewed with skepticism. As a recent Medscape article advised,
Third we must trust in our fellow citizens to maintain the public health measures of social distancing and mask wearing even after there is widespread vaccination. If we are to reap the benefits of a safe and effective vaccine, we must be a community of immunity, not just isolated inoculated individuals. We as health care practitioners must do all we can to educate the public that the adverse reactions to the vaccine so prominently featured in the media are expected with any new and complex biological product and do not signal risk that outweighs the deadliness of the virus.10
Fourth, and finally, we must trust in ourselves as health care professionals and administrators. We in the DoD, VA, and PHS have the knowledge and skills to endure the onslaught of pain and suffering we will all experience in one way or another in these next long months. We must believe that our courage and compassion can turn a vaccine into vaccinations sufficient to relieve the COVID-19 siege of our hospitals and intensive care units. When that day comes, hope will have been a plan we could trust.
1. US Food and Drug Administration. FDA take key action in fight against COVID-19 by issuing emergency use authorization for first COVID-19 vaccine [press release]. Published December 11, 2020. Accessed December 22, 2020. https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/fda-takes-key-action-fight-against-covid-19-issuing-emergency-use-authorization-first-covid-19
2. US Food and Drug Administration. FDA takes additional action in fight against COVID-19 by Issuing emergency use authorization for second COVID-19 vaccine [press release]. Published December 18, 2020. Accessed December 22, 2020. https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/fda-takes-additional-action-fight-against-covid-19-issuing-emergency-use-authorization-second-covid
3. US Food and Drug Administration. FDA approves first treatment for COVID-19 [press release]. Published October 22, 2020. Accessed December 20, 2020. https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/fda-approves-first-treatment-covid-19
4. US Food and Drug Administration. Coronavirus (COVID-19) update: FDA revokes emergency use authorization for chloroquine and hydroxychloroquine [press release]. Published June 15, 2020. Accessed December 22, 2020. https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/coronavirus-covid-19-update-fda-revokes-emergency-use-authorization-chloroquine-and
5. US Food and Drug Administration. Emergency use authorization for vaccines explained. Updated November 20, 2020. Accessed December 22, 2020. https://www.fda.gov/vaccines-blood-biologics/vaccines/emergency-use-authorization-vaccines-explained
6. Healy J, Tompkins L, Burch ADS. ‘A shot of hope’: what the vaccine is like for frontline doctors and nurses. New York Times. Updated December 17, 2020. Accessed December 22, 2020. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/14/us/coronavirus-vaccine-doctors-nurses.html
7. Pellegrino E, Thomasma DC. The Virtues in Medical Practice . New York: Oxford University Press; 1993:65.
8. Brenan M. Willingness to get Covid-19 vaccine ticks up to 63% in the U.S. Published December 8, 2020. Accessed December 22, 2020. https://news.gallup.com/poll/327425/willingness-covid-vaccine-ticks.aspx
9. Eldred SM. Trusted messengers may help disenfranchised communities overcome vaccine hesitancy. Published December 17, 2020. Accessed December 22, 2020. https://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/942847
10. Chiu A. ‘Absolutely normal’: Covid vaccine side effects are not reason to avoid the shots, doctors say. Washington Post. Published December 3, 2020. Accessed December 22, 2020. https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/wellness/vaccine-side-effects-covid/2020/12/02/55bebac0-342c-11eb-8d38-6aea1adb3839_story.html
1. US Food and Drug Administration. FDA take key action in fight against COVID-19 by issuing emergency use authorization for first COVID-19 vaccine [press release]. Published December 11, 2020. Accessed December 22, 2020. https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/fda-takes-key-action-fight-against-covid-19-issuing-emergency-use-authorization-first-covid-19
2. US Food and Drug Administration. FDA takes additional action in fight against COVID-19 by Issuing emergency use authorization for second COVID-19 vaccine [press release]. Published December 18, 2020. Accessed December 22, 2020. https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/fda-takes-additional-action-fight-against-covid-19-issuing-emergency-use-authorization-second-covid
3. US Food and Drug Administration. FDA approves first treatment for COVID-19 [press release]. Published October 22, 2020. Accessed December 20, 2020. https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/fda-approves-first-treatment-covid-19
4. US Food and Drug Administration. Coronavirus (COVID-19) update: FDA revokes emergency use authorization for chloroquine and hydroxychloroquine [press release]. Published June 15, 2020. Accessed December 22, 2020. https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/coronavirus-covid-19-update-fda-revokes-emergency-use-authorization-chloroquine-and
5. US Food and Drug Administration. Emergency use authorization for vaccines explained. Updated November 20, 2020. Accessed December 22, 2020. https://www.fda.gov/vaccines-blood-biologics/vaccines/emergency-use-authorization-vaccines-explained
6. Healy J, Tompkins L, Burch ADS. ‘A shot of hope’: what the vaccine is like for frontline doctors and nurses. New York Times. Updated December 17, 2020. Accessed December 22, 2020. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/14/us/coronavirus-vaccine-doctors-nurses.html
7. Pellegrino E, Thomasma DC. The Virtues in Medical Practice . New York: Oxford University Press; 1993:65.
8. Brenan M. Willingness to get Covid-19 vaccine ticks up to 63% in the U.S. Published December 8, 2020. Accessed December 22, 2020. https://news.gallup.com/poll/327425/willingness-covid-vaccine-ticks.aspx
9. Eldred SM. Trusted messengers may help disenfranchised communities overcome vaccine hesitancy. Published December 17, 2020. Accessed December 22, 2020. https://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/942847
10. Chiu A. ‘Absolutely normal’: Covid vaccine side effects are not reason to avoid the shots, doctors say. Washington Post. Published December 3, 2020. Accessed December 22, 2020. https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/wellness/vaccine-side-effects-covid/2020/12/02/55bebac0-342c-11eb-8d38-6aea1adb3839_story.html
Introducing the VA Boston Medical Forum
The case history has been the cornerstone of clinical learning since the first record of medical encounters in ancient Egypt.1 The methodical process of taking a patient history by Hippocratic physicians enabled an empirical approach to medicine centuries before the scientific revolution. From Freud in psychiatry to Giovanni Morgagni in pathology—case reports have been the time-honored and time-tested vehicle for teaching medicine.2
Most American physicians grew up reading the most famous modern series of histories, the “Case Records of the Massachusetts General Hospital,” published in that pinnacle of medical scholarship, The New England Journal of Medicine. Now, also from Boston, I’m proud to announce that Federal Practitioner has its own case series, The VA Boston Medical Forum (HIV-Positive Veteran With Progressive Visual Changes, page 18).
The VA Boston Medical Forum is a printed (and electronic, these days) version of the case conferences held at the flagship VA Boston Healthcare System (VABHS), which has academic affiliations with the Boston Medical Center, Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center, and Brigham and Women’s Hospital. Brian Hoffman, professor emeritus at Harvard Medical School, who previously served as the chief of internal medicine at the VABHS, founded the series, which has continued for more than 10 years.
The didactic driving force of this medical forum are the VABHS chief medical residents and their director of residency education. It is—as you will see in this issue—a case report taken from a weekly multidisciplinary conference. We feel the authors have captured much of the interactive ambience of those case conferences, including laboratory values, medical images, extensive references, and takeaway points, as though you were there at morning rounds.
Each case involves a VA patient and presents in traditional case history format a discussion of the diagnosis and treatment of a challenging patient. Just as they do at the actual case conferences, the chief medical residents moderate these discussions, which also feature expert opinions from nationally recognized leaders in their respective medical specialties.
From the many cases they present, the chief medical residents and their director of residency education will select cases that focus on clinical problems relevant to those caring for veterans, such as homelessness, comorbid substance use disorders, along with thought provoking and complex medical presentations that will test the clinical reasoning of the most experienced diagnostician.
Over many years as a medical educator, I have come to believe that whether it is ethics or surgery, we all learn best from an interesting case history and a good medical mystery. We hope to provide both in this conversational, question-and-answer format. Think back to your days on the wards: You can have all that intellectual stimulation without the night call and “pimping.” So from the comfort of your favorite reading spot, we invite you to sit back and enjoy. This is continuing medical education at its best, and I am proud to welcome our readers to the inaugural case of what we at Federal Practitioner hope will be an enduring feature. We thank the authors of the Boston Medical Forum for their dedication to enhancing VA academic medicine and, most important, helping us all to be smarter caregivers for our veterans.
1. Nissen T, Wynn R. The history of the case report: a selective review. JRSM Open. 2014;5(4): 2054270414523410.
2. Nuland SB. Doctors: The Biography of Medicine. New York: Alfred Knopf, 1988.
The case history has been the cornerstone of clinical learning since the first record of medical encounters in ancient Egypt.1 The methodical process of taking a patient history by Hippocratic physicians enabled an empirical approach to medicine centuries before the scientific revolution. From Freud in psychiatry to Giovanni Morgagni in pathology—case reports have been the time-honored and time-tested vehicle for teaching medicine.2
Most American physicians grew up reading the most famous modern series of histories, the “Case Records of the Massachusetts General Hospital,” published in that pinnacle of medical scholarship, The New England Journal of Medicine. Now, also from Boston, I’m proud to announce that Federal Practitioner has its own case series, The VA Boston Medical Forum (HIV-Positive Veteran With Progressive Visual Changes, page 18).
The VA Boston Medical Forum is a printed (and electronic, these days) version of the case conferences held at the flagship VA Boston Healthcare System (VABHS), which has academic affiliations with the Boston Medical Center, Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center, and Brigham and Women’s Hospital. Brian Hoffman, professor emeritus at Harvard Medical School, who previously served as the chief of internal medicine at the VABHS, founded the series, which has continued for more than 10 years.
The didactic driving force of this medical forum are the VABHS chief medical residents and their director of residency education. It is—as you will see in this issue—a case report taken from a weekly multidisciplinary conference. We feel the authors have captured much of the interactive ambience of those case conferences, including laboratory values, medical images, extensive references, and takeaway points, as though you were there at morning rounds.
Each case involves a VA patient and presents in traditional case history format a discussion of the diagnosis and treatment of a challenging patient. Just as they do at the actual case conferences, the chief medical residents moderate these discussions, which also feature expert opinions from nationally recognized leaders in their respective medical specialties.
From the many cases they present, the chief medical residents and their director of residency education will select cases that focus on clinical problems relevant to those caring for veterans, such as homelessness, comorbid substance use disorders, along with thought provoking and complex medical presentations that will test the clinical reasoning of the most experienced diagnostician.
Over many years as a medical educator, I have come to believe that whether it is ethics or surgery, we all learn best from an interesting case history and a good medical mystery. We hope to provide both in this conversational, question-and-answer format. Think back to your days on the wards: You can have all that intellectual stimulation without the night call and “pimping.” So from the comfort of your favorite reading spot, we invite you to sit back and enjoy. This is continuing medical education at its best, and I am proud to welcome our readers to the inaugural case of what we at Federal Practitioner hope will be an enduring feature. We thank the authors of the Boston Medical Forum for their dedication to enhancing VA academic medicine and, most important, helping us all to be smarter caregivers for our veterans.
The case history has been the cornerstone of clinical learning since the first record of medical encounters in ancient Egypt.1 The methodical process of taking a patient history by Hippocratic physicians enabled an empirical approach to medicine centuries before the scientific revolution. From Freud in psychiatry to Giovanni Morgagni in pathology—case reports have been the time-honored and time-tested vehicle for teaching medicine.2
Most American physicians grew up reading the most famous modern series of histories, the “Case Records of the Massachusetts General Hospital,” published in that pinnacle of medical scholarship, The New England Journal of Medicine. Now, also from Boston, I’m proud to announce that Federal Practitioner has its own case series, The VA Boston Medical Forum (HIV-Positive Veteran With Progressive Visual Changes, page 18).
The VA Boston Medical Forum is a printed (and electronic, these days) version of the case conferences held at the flagship VA Boston Healthcare System (VABHS), which has academic affiliations with the Boston Medical Center, Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center, and Brigham and Women’s Hospital. Brian Hoffman, professor emeritus at Harvard Medical School, who previously served as the chief of internal medicine at the VABHS, founded the series, which has continued for more than 10 years.
The didactic driving force of this medical forum are the VABHS chief medical residents and their director of residency education. It is—as you will see in this issue—a case report taken from a weekly multidisciplinary conference. We feel the authors have captured much of the interactive ambience of those case conferences, including laboratory values, medical images, extensive references, and takeaway points, as though you were there at morning rounds.
Each case involves a VA patient and presents in traditional case history format a discussion of the diagnosis and treatment of a challenging patient. Just as they do at the actual case conferences, the chief medical residents moderate these discussions, which also feature expert opinions from nationally recognized leaders in their respective medical specialties.
From the many cases they present, the chief medical residents and their director of residency education will select cases that focus on clinical problems relevant to those caring for veterans, such as homelessness, comorbid substance use disorders, along with thought provoking and complex medical presentations that will test the clinical reasoning of the most experienced diagnostician.
Over many years as a medical educator, I have come to believe that whether it is ethics or surgery, we all learn best from an interesting case history and a good medical mystery. We hope to provide both in this conversational, question-and-answer format. Think back to your days on the wards: You can have all that intellectual stimulation without the night call and “pimping.” So from the comfort of your favorite reading spot, we invite you to sit back and enjoy. This is continuing medical education at its best, and I am proud to welcome our readers to the inaugural case of what we at Federal Practitioner hope will be an enduring feature. We thank the authors of the Boston Medical Forum for their dedication to enhancing VA academic medicine and, most important, helping us all to be smarter caregivers for our veterans.
1. Nissen T, Wynn R. The history of the case report: a selective review. JRSM Open. 2014;5(4): 2054270414523410.
2. Nuland SB. Doctors: The Biography of Medicine. New York: Alfred Knopf, 1988.
1. Nissen T, Wynn R. The history of the case report: a selective review. JRSM Open. 2014;5(4): 2054270414523410.
2. Nuland SB. Doctors: The Biography of Medicine. New York: Alfred Knopf, 1988.
The VA Is in Critical Condition, but What Is the Prognosis?
In his first ever—and perhaps the first ever state of the VA—speech delivered on May 30, 2017, VA Secretary David J. Shulkin, MD, reported to the nation and Congress that “the VA is still in critical condition.” This medical metaphor reflects Dr. Shulkin’s distinction of being the only physician ever to hold this cabinet-level post.
For anyone in health care, such a reference immediately calls forth a variety of associations—most of them serious concerns for the status of the VA and whether it will survive. In this editorial, I will expand on this metaphor and explore its meaning for the future of the VA.
Dr. Shulkin extended the metaphor when he said that the “VA requires intensive care.” For clinicians, this remark tells us that the VA is either seriously ill or injured. Yet there is hope because the chief doctor of the VA reassures us that the patient—the largest health care system in the country—is improving. This improvement from critical care to intensive care status informs us that the VA was very sick, maybe even dying, during the previous administration in which Dr. Shulkin served as VA’s Under Secretary for Health.
Dr. Shulkin, a general internist who still sees primary care patients at the VA, gave us a diagnosis of the VA’s most serious symptoms: a lack of access to timely care, a high rate of veteran suicides, an inability to enforce employee accountability, multiple obstacles to hiring and retaining qualified staff, an unacceptable quality of care at some VAMCs, and a backlog of disability claims due to inefficient processing.
Dr. Shulkin also gave us a broad idea of his goal for care, “We are taking immediate and decisive steps stabilizing the organization.” But the more I thought about this impressive speech, the more I wondered, What is the VA’s actual diagnosis?
Several of the many news commentaries analyzing Shulkin’s State of the VA speech suggested possible etiologies. According to the Public Broadcasting Service (PBS), “In a ‘State of the VA’ report, Shulkin, a physician, issued a blunt diagnosis: ‘There is a lot of work to do.’” Astute clinicians will immediately recognize that PBS is right about the secretary’s honesty regarding the magnitude of the task facing him.
He was not providing a diagnosis as much as offering an indirect assessment of the patient’s condition. “A lot of work,” although not a diagnosis, is a colloquial description of the treatment plan that the secretary further outlined in his report. Like any good treatment plan, there is a direct correlation between the major symptoms of the disorder and the therapies that Dr. Shulkin prescribed.
The Secretary recommended and the President signed the Department of Veterans Affairs Accountability and Whistleblower Protection Act of 2017 on June 23, 2017, to make it easier to discipline and terminate VA employees who may be keeping the VA organization ill or at least preventing it from getting better. He also prescribed continued and even higher dose infusions of community care to treat the central access problem. In addition, Dr. Shulkin ordered that the most effective available interventions be used for suicide prevention, enhancement of the overall quality of care, and to improve accountability.
Even with the most efficacious treatments, a high-functioning intensive care unit needs state-of-theart technology and equipment. In a long-awaited announcement, Dr. Shulkin reported on June 5 that of 2 competing modalities to revive the VA’s ailing electronic health record system—the brain of our critical care patient—rather than repair the moribund CPRS, the VA will receive a transplant of the DoD MHS Genesis. Critical care, especially when delivered in a combat zone, requires difficult triage decisions. The secretary has made similar tough resource allocation decisions, determining that some of the VA’s oldest and most debilitated facilities will not be sustained in their present form.
I am near the end of this editorial and still do not have a diagnosis. Pundits, politicians, and policy specialists all have their differential diagnosis as well as veterans groups and VA employees.“Bloated bureaucracy” is the diagnosis from many of these VA critics. Dr. Shulkin proposed a remedy for this disease: He plans to consolidate the VA headquarters.
Even more important, for those who believe the VA should not have a DNR but be allowed to recover, what does the physician who holds the VA’s life in his hands believe is the prognosis for this 86-year-old institution? Dr. Shulkin expressed the hope that the VA can recover its health, saying he is “confident that we will be able turn VA into the organization veterans and their families deserve, and one that America can take pride in.” The most vehement of VA’s opponents would say that pouring additional millions of dollars into such a moribund entity is futile care. Yet the secretary and thousands of VA patients, staff, and supporters believe that the agency that President Lincoln created at the end of the bloodiest war in U.S. history still has value and can be restored to meaningful service for those who have, who are, and who will place their lives on the line for their country.
In his first ever—and perhaps the first ever state of the VA—speech delivered on May 30, 2017, VA Secretary David J. Shulkin, MD, reported to the nation and Congress that “the VA is still in critical condition.” This medical metaphor reflects Dr. Shulkin’s distinction of being the only physician ever to hold this cabinet-level post.
For anyone in health care, such a reference immediately calls forth a variety of associations—most of them serious concerns for the status of the VA and whether it will survive. In this editorial, I will expand on this metaphor and explore its meaning for the future of the VA.
Dr. Shulkin extended the metaphor when he said that the “VA requires intensive care.” For clinicians, this remark tells us that the VA is either seriously ill or injured. Yet there is hope because the chief doctor of the VA reassures us that the patient—the largest health care system in the country—is improving. This improvement from critical care to intensive care status informs us that the VA was very sick, maybe even dying, during the previous administration in which Dr. Shulkin served as VA’s Under Secretary for Health.
Dr. Shulkin, a general internist who still sees primary care patients at the VA, gave us a diagnosis of the VA’s most serious symptoms: a lack of access to timely care, a high rate of veteran suicides, an inability to enforce employee accountability, multiple obstacles to hiring and retaining qualified staff, an unacceptable quality of care at some VAMCs, and a backlog of disability claims due to inefficient processing.
Dr. Shulkin also gave us a broad idea of his goal for care, “We are taking immediate and decisive steps stabilizing the organization.” But the more I thought about this impressive speech, the more I wondered, What is the VA’s actual diagnosis?
Several of the many news commentaries analyzing Shulkin’s State of the VA speech suggested possible etiologies. According to the Public Broadcasting Service (PBS), “In a ‘State of the VA’ report, Shulkin, a physician, issued a blunt diagnosis: ‘There is a lot of work to do.’” Astute clinicians will immediately recognize that PBS is right about the secretary’s honesty regarding the magnitude of the task facing him.
He was not providing a diagnosis as much as offering an indirect assessment of the patient’s condition. “A lot of work,” although not a diagnosis, is a colloquial description of the treatment plan that the secretary further outlined in his report. Like any good treatment plan, there is a direct correlation between the major symptoms of the disorder and the therapies that Dr. Shulkin prescribed.
The Secretary recommended and the President signed the Department of Veterans Affairs Accountability and Whistleblower Protection Act of 2017 on June 23, 2017, to make it easier to discipline and terminate VA employees who may be keeping the VA organization ill or at least preventing it from getting better. He also prescribed continued and even higher dose infusions of community care to treat the central access problem. In addition, Dr. Shulkin ordered that the most effective available interventions be used for suicide prevention, enhancement of the overall quality of care, and to improve accountability.
Even with the most efficacious treatments, a high-functioning intensive care unit needs state-of-theart technology and equipment. In a long-awaited announcement, Dr. Shulkin reported on June 5 that of 2 competing modalities to revive the VA’s ailing electronic health record system—the brain of our critical care patient—rather than repair the moribund CPRS, the VA will receive a transplant of the DoD MHS Genesis. Critical care, especially when delivered in a combat zone, requires difficult triage decisions. The secretary has made similar tough resource allocation decisions, determining that some of the VA’s oldest and most debilitated facilities will not be sustained in their present form.
I am near the end of this editorial and still do not have a diagnosis. Pundits, politicians, and policy specialists all have their differential diagnosis as well as veterans groups and VA employees.“Bloated bureaucracy” is the diagnosis from many of these VA critics. Dr. Shulkin proposed a remedy for this disease: He plans to consolidate the VA headquarters.
Even more important, for those who believe the VA should not have a DNR but be allowed to recover, what does the physician who holds the VA’s life in his hands believe is the prognosis for this 86-year-old institution? Dr. Shulkin expressed the hope that the VA can recover its health, saying he is “confident that we will be able turn VA into the organization veterans and their families deserve, and one that America can take pride in.” The most vehement of VA’s opponents would say that pouring additional millions of dollars into such a moribund entity is futile care. Yet the secretary and thousands of VA patients, staff, and supporters believe that the agency that President Lincoln created at the end of the bloodiest war in U.S. history still has value and can be restored to meaningful service for those who have, who are, and who will place their lives on the line for their country.
In his first ever—and perhaps the first ever state of the VA—speech delivered on May 30, 2017, VA Secretary David J. Shulkin, MD, reported to the nation and Congress that “the VA is still in critical condition.” This medical metaphor reflects Dr. Shulkin’s distinction of being the only physician ever to hold this cabinet-level post.
For anyone in health care, such a reference immediately calls forth a variety of associations—most of them serious concerns for the status of the VA and whether it will survive. In this editorial, I will expand on this metaphor and explore its meaning for the future of the VA.
Dr. Shulkin extended the metaphor when he said that the “VA requires intensive care.” For clinicians, this remark tells us that the VA is either seriously ill or injured. Yet there is hope because the chief doctor of the VA reassures us that the patient—the largest health care system in the country—is improving. This improvement from critical care to intensive care status informs us that the VA was very sick, maybe even dying, during the previous administration in which Dr. Shulkin served as VA’s Under Secretary for Health.
Dr. Shulkin, a general internist who still sees primary care patients at the VA, gave us a diagnosis of the VA’s most serious symptoms: a lack of access to timely care, a high rate of veteran suicides, an inability to enforce employee accountability, multiple obstacles to hiring and retaining qualified staff, an unacceptable quality of care at some VAMCs, and a backlog of disability claims due to inefficient processing.
Dr. Shulkin also gave us a broad idea of his goal for care, “We are taking immediate and decisive steps stabilizing the organization.” But the more I thought about this impressive speech, the more I wondered, What is the VA’s actual diagnosis?
Several of the many news commentaries analyzing Shulkin’s State of the VA speech suggested possible etiologies. According to the Public Broadcasting Service (PBS), “In a ‘State of the VA’ report, Shulkin, a physician, issued a blunt diagnosis: ‘There is a lot of work to do.’” Astute clinicians will immediately recognize that PBS is right about the secretary’s honesty regarding the magnitude of the task facing him.
He was not providing a diagnosis as much as offering an indirect assessment of the patient’s condition. “A lot of work,” although not a diagnosis, is a colloquial description of the treatment plan that the secretary further outlined in his report. Like any good treatment plan, there is a direct correlation between the major symptoms of the disorder and the therapies that Dr. Shulkin prescribed.
The Secretary recommended and the President signed the Department of Veterans Affairs Accountability and Whistleblower Protection Act of 2017 on June 23, 2017, to make it easier to discipline and terminate VA employees who may be keeping the VA organization ill or at least preventing it from getting better. He also prescribed continued and even higher dose infusions of community care to treat the central access problem. In addition, Dr. Shulkin ordered that the most effective available interventions be used for suicide prevention, enhancement of the overall quality of care, and to improve accountability.
Even with the most efficacious treatments, a high-functioning intensive care unit needs state-of-theart technology and equipment. In a long-awaited announcement, Dr. Shulkin reported on June 5 that of 2 competing modalities to revive the VA’s ailing electronic health record system—the brain of our critical care patient—rather than repair the moribund CPRS, the VA will receive a transplant of the DoD MHS Genesis. Critical care, especially when delivered in a combat zone, requires difficult triage decisions. The secretary has made similar tough resource allocation decisions, determining that some of the VA’s oldest and most debilitated facilities will not be sustained in their present form.
I am near the end of this editorial and still do not have a diagnosis. Pundits, politicians, and policy specialists all have their differential diagnosis as well as veterans groups and VA employees.“Bloated bureaucracy” is the diagnosis from many of these VA critics. Dr. Shulkin proposed a remedy for this disease: He plans to consolidate the VA headquarters.
Even more important, for those who believe the VA should not have a DNR but be allowed to recover, what does the physician who holds the VA’s life in his hands believe is the prognosis for this 86-year-old institution? Dr. Shulkin expressed the hope that the VA can recover its health, saying he is “confident that we will be able turn VA into the organization veterans and their families deserve, and one that America can take pride in.” The most vehement of VA’s opponents would say that pouring additional millions of dollars into such a moribund entity is futile care. Yet the secretary and thousands of VA patients, staff, and supporters believe that the agency that President Lincoln created at the end of the bloodiest war in U.S. history still has value and can be restored to meaningful service for those who have, who are, and who will place their lives on the line for their country.
